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THE BAIT-AND-SWITCH IN DIRECT DEMOCRACY
GLEN STASZEWSKI*
INTRODUCTION
On November 2, 2004, the voters of Michigan joined ten other
states in approving constitutional amendments to prohibit same-sex
marriage.1 This development has already received widespread attention
in scholarly journals and the popular press because of a perception that
the electorate's opportunity to vote on socially conservative ballot
measures was critical to the reelection of President George W. Bush.2
Moreover, the overwhelming success of such measures, despite state
laws that already prohibited same-sex marriage in most of the relevant
jurisdictions, provides apparent support for the claim that our society is
in the midst of a "culture war," and highlights the tension between the
populist impulse underlying direct democracy and the fear that it has
* Associate Professor, Michigan State University College of Law. The
author is grateful for the helpful comments that he received on this project when it was
presented at the 2005 annual meeting of the Central States Law School Association and
a faculty workshop at Michigan State University College of Law. He would also like to
thank Barry Friedman, Kevin Kennedy, Greg Mitchell, Noga Morag-Levine, and
Howard Wasserman for providing valuable advice on earlier drafts of the Article.
Finally, he would like to thank Mark Baxter, Joseph Gavin, Brian Saxe, Lena
Zwarensteyn, and the staff of the MSU College of Law library for their excellent
research assistance.
1. See Thad Kousser & Mathew D. McCubbins, Social Choice, Crypto-
Initiatives, and Policymaking by Direct Democracy, 78 S. CAL. L. REv. 949, 971
(2005) ("In the November 2004 election, eleven states (Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky,
Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, and Utah)
considered defense of marriage initiatives, and they all passed.").
2. See id. at 969-72 (identifying proposals to prohibit same-sex marriage in
Ohio and Kentucky as examples of "crypto-initiatives," a recent trend in which ballot
measures "are designed by agenda setters, often from outside the state or locality in
which the initiative is being run," who hope to accomplish goals other than
policymaking); Susan Page, Shaping Politics from the Pulpits, USA TODAY, Aug. 3,
2005, at IA ("Evangelical Christian leaders nationwide have been emboldened by their
role in re-electing President Bush and galvanized by their success in campaigning for
constitutional amendments to ban same-sex marriage, passed in 18 states so far."); see
also Daniel A. Smith, Was Rove Right? The Partisan Wedge and Turnout Effects of
Issue 1, Ohio's 2004 Ballot Initiative to Ban Gay Marriage (Jan. 15, 2005) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the University of Southern California-Caltech Center for the
Study of Law and Politics), available at http:// lawweb.usc.edu/cslp/conferences/
directdemocracy_05/documents/smith.pdf.
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become a powerful tool for imposing the "tyranny of the majority." 3
Finally, there is a basis for believing that these laws could be
invalidated by the judiciary on federal constitutional grounds in light of
the Supreme Court's decisions in Romer v. Evans and Lawrence v.
Texas.4 It is nearly certain that each of these issues will continue to
receive well-deserved attention in the months and years ahead.
Regardless of the subject matter, however, the events surrounding
Proposal 2 in Michigan, and similar constitutional amendments in other
states, provide a disturbing example of pervasive structural flaws in the
ballot initiative process. These problems stem, in part, from the vague
drafting of measures, which provided in the case of Proposal 2 that "the
union of one man and one woman in marriage shall be the only
agreement recognized as a marriage or similar union for any purpose."5
Although no one in Michigan seemed to know the precise reach of this
language prior to the election, opponents of the measure claimed that it
could be used to prohibit public employers from providing benefits for
the domestic partners of gay and lesbian employees.6 In response,
leading proponents of the measure chastised the opposition for seeking
to distract the electorate from the "real issue" and claimed that "the
proposal [would] not affect benefits offered to people living together or
3. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Pluralism and Distrust: How Courts
Can Support Democracy by Lowering the Stakes of Politics, 114 YALE L.J. 1279, 1325
(2005) (advocating "greater judicial caution" on the issue of same-sex marriage
"because primordial loyalties are so deeply implicated on both sides of this still-intense
culture war"). For discussions of the tension between direct democracy and the
structural safeguards provided by the U.S. Constitution, see Julian N. Eule, Judicial
Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503 (1990); Glen Staszewski, Rejecting
the Myth of Popular Sovereignty and Applying an Agency Model to Direct Democracy,
56 VAND. L. REv. 395 (2003).
4. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (invalidating a Texas statute
that made it a crime for two persons of the same sex to engage in certain intimate
sexual contact under the Due Process Clause); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996)
(invalidating an initiated amendment to Colorado's Constitution that prohibited
governmental officials from providing any protected status to gays and lesbians under
the Equal Protection Clause); see also Citizens for Equal Prot., Inc. v. Bruning, 368 F.
Supp. 2d 980 (D. Neb. 2005) (holding that a state constitutional amendment that
prohibited the official recognition of same-sex marriage or other similar relationships
violated several provisions of the U.S. Constitution).
5. 2004 Mich. Legis. Serv. A-I (West) (emphasis added).
6. See Citizens Research Council of Mich., State Ballot Issues on the
November General Election Ballot, CRC MEMORANDUM, Sept. 2004, at 1, available at
http://www.crcmich.org/PUBLICAT/2000s/2004/memolO76.pdf (explaining that the
long-term implications of Proposal 2 are "open to interpretation" and that its opponents
claim that it could result in the "rescission of same-sex benefits currently offered by
several state universities and local units of government").
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in same-sex relationships." 7  Almost immediately after the election,
however, some of the same proponents took the position that the
ratification of a collective bargaining agreement between the state and
public employees, which included domestic partnership benefits for
certain gay and lesbian workers, would have violated "the letter and the
spirit of the amendment." 8 One of the reported coauthors of Proposal 2
and perhaps its most outspoken advocate declared that "[b]enefits only
to homosexuals are a formal recognition of a homosexual relationship
as equal or similar to marriage .... And the voters have said they
don't want that." 9  Indeed, the attorney general of Michigan
subsequently issued a formal advisory opinion declaring that a
municipality's policy of providing benefits to the domestic partners of
gay and lesbian employees conflicts with the "plain meaning" of
Proposal 2.10 Although a state trial court disagreed with this opinion
based on a different understanding of the "plain meaning" of the
constitutional amendment," the attorney general's motion to stay the
trial court's decision was granted and the issue is currently pending in
the Michigan Court of Appeals. 12
This sequence of events in Michigan-which could quite
conceivably occur elsewhere13-dramatically illustrates the bait-and-
7. See Jay Kaplan & Kary L. Moss, Prop 2 Supporters Should Keep Word
on Allowing Partner Benefits, DETROIT NEWS, Nov. 18, 2004, at 17A; ifra notes 26-
28 and accompanying text (quoting reported statements of several initiative proponents
prior to the election).
8. See Laura Berman, Courts Will Have the Last Say on State Benefits for
Same-Sex Pairs, DETROIT NEWS, Dec. 5, 2004, at 1B (quoting Gary Glenn, president of
the American Family Association of Michigan).
9. See Stacey Range, Proposal 2 Supporters Taking Aim at Benefits,
LANSING ST. J., Nov. 4, 2004, at 6 (quoting Gary Glenn); see also Berman, supra note
8 (reporting that Gary Glenn claimed to understand the meaning of Proposal 2 because
"he co-authored its language").
10. See Constitutionality of City Providing Same-Sex Domestic Partnership
Benefits, Op. Att'y Gen. No. 7171 (Mar. 16, 2005), available at 2005 WL 639112
[hereinafter Same-Sex Domestic Partnership Benefits].
11. See Nat'l Pride at Work, Inc. v. Granholm, 2005 WL 3048040 (Mich.
Cir. Ct. 2005).
12. See Order, Nat'l Pride at Work, Inc. v. Granholm, No. 265870 (Mich.
Ct. App. Oct. 31, 2005).
13. The broad scope of similar constitutional amendments in other states has
already led to extensive litigation and collateral consequences that were unanticipated
by voters. See, e.g., Forum for Equal. PAC v. McKeithen, 893 So. 2d 715, 716 (La.
2005) (reversing a trial court's decision that Louisiana's constitutional amendment
violated the state's single-subject rule and holding that each of its provisions was
"germane to the single object of defense of marriage and constitute[d] an element of the
plan advanced to achieve this object"); State v. Burk, No. CR 462510, 2005 WL
786212 (Ohio Ct. Com. P1. Mar. 23, 2005) (dismissing a criminal indictment and
holding that the application of Ohio's domestic violence statute to an unmarried
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switch in direct democracy. In order to utilize this technique, initiative
proponents must (1) qualify a particularly popular idea for the ballot;
(2) draft the measure in sufficiently broad or ambiguous terms to create
"collateral consequences"; (3) either evade questions about those
collateral consequences during the election campaign or flatly deny that
they were intended (perhaps criticizing the opposition for even posing
such questions); and (4) establish the collateral consequences through
litigation or by lobbying executive officials who are responsible for
implementing the measure. This Article claims that the foregoing
technique constitutes lawmaking at its worst, and that jurisdictions that
authorize the ballot initiative should take action to prevent the bait-and-
switch in direct democracy.
The story of Proposal 2 is outrageous because the collateral
consequences at issue were apparently intended by some of the
initiative proponents, and their actions seem premeditated. Moreover,
the initiative proponents expressly addressed the relevant interpretive
issue prior to the election and therefore appear to have affirmatively
misled the voters. Finally, some of the same individuals who claimed
that the amendment would not affect the legality of domestic
partnership benefits are involved in the effort to eliminate them. These
aggravating factors are unnecessary, however, for the ballot initiative
process to lead to collateral consequences that the voters never
intended, and which they may have opposed if the relevant questions
had been squarely brought to their attention. Accordingly, the bait-and-
defendant who cohabited with the victim violated a constitutional amendment that
prohibited the state from recognizing "a legal status for relationships of unmarried
individuals that intends to approximate the design, qualities, significance or effect of
marriage"); but see State v. Newell, No. 2004CA00264, 2005 WL 1364937 (Ohio Ct.
App. May 31, 2005) (holding that "the Defense of Marriage Amendment has no
application to criminal statutes in general or the domestic violence statute in
particular"). Because action is currently being taken to place similar propositions on
election ballots in as many as twelve additional states in 2006, these issues will likely
proliferate in the near future. See, e.g., Lisa Leff, Lockyer Gives Details of
Amendment to Ban Same-Sex Marriage, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., July 26, 2005,
available at http:www.signonsandiego.com/uniontrib/20050726/news ln26gaywed.html
(reporting that the sponsors of a proposed constitutional amendment to prohibit same-
sex marriage in California plan to challenge the ballot title and summary issued by the
state attorney general, which highlighted how the measure would strip same-sex couples
of most domestic partnership benefits, on the grounds that this description is
'prejudicial and erroneous"); David Klepper, Proposal Sets Stage for Legal Battles,
KAN. CITY STAR, Mar. 30, 2005, at B1 (explaining that opponents of a proposed
constitutional amendment that would prohibit the State of Kansas from recognizing
same-sex marriage or extending "the rights and incidents of marriage" to other
relationships have warned that this initiative would likely have unintended
consequences, but reporting that the proponents have dismissed such concerns as "a red
herring" and "a scare tactic").
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switch in direct democracy is, in reality, a particularly egregious
version of a far more widespread problem with the ballot initiative
process.
The Article begins by describing the story of Proposal 2 and how
some of its proponents are seeking to complete the bait-and-switch in
direct democracy. Part II claims that the existing initiative process
facilitates this technique by foreclosing opportunities to improve the
drafting of ballot measures, and refusing to hold initiative proponents
sufficiently accountable for their actions. This Part also explains that
the same structural shortcomings increase the risk that successful ballot
measures will have other collateral consequences not intended by the
voters. Part III evaluates the ability to alleviate these problems through
existing procedural safeguards or the adoption of interpretive
techniques that narrowly construe ambiguous ballot measures to
minimize collateral damage. While endorsing the latter solution, this
Part also explains that these problems could be attacked more directly
by the adoption of basic structural reforms of the ballot initiative
process that have proven effective in other contexts. Part IV considers
whether the shortcomings of candidate elections and the traditional
legislative process undermine the rationale for proposals of this nature
to reform the ballot initiative process. The Article concludes that while
more candid deliberation is desirable in each of these contexts, the
ballot initiative process has a distinct capacity to combine passionate
voting (by the electorate) and instrumental lawmaking (by the initiative
proponents and others) in a way that is especially prone toward
divergence (based on the absence of representation and other structural
safeguards). The bait-and-switch in direct democracy is particularly
troubling from a variety of different normative perspectives because it
self-consciously seeks to capitalize on this state of affairs.
I. THE STORY OF PROPOSAL 2
The successful effort to amend the Michigan Constitution to
prohibit the recognition of same-sex marriage and "similar unions for
any purpose" likely began with a confluence of two distinct events.
First, the gay rights movement made significant gains through recent
judicial decisions, which suggested that Michigan's existing statutory
prohibition of same-sex marriage could be vulnerable to legal
challenge.' 4 Second, the presidential election and several major
14. See supra note 4; Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941
(Mass. 2003) (holding that the state's limitation of the protections, benefits, and
obligations of civil marriage to couples of the opposite sex violated equal protection
principles of the state constitution). A statute that was previously enacted by the
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congressional races promised to be hotly contested in 2004, especially
in a few key battleground states. Conservative Republicans viewed the
opportunity to place the issue of same-sex marriage on the ballot as a
dual opportunity to disable state courts from recognizing further
advances in gay rights and to improve the electoral prospects of their
favored candidates. 15
The first attempt to implement this strategy in Michigan involved
the introduction of resolutions to amend the state constitution to prohibit
the recognition of same-sex marriage or similar unions in both
chambers of the legislature.' 6 If a joint resolution were adopted by a
two-thirds majority of both legislative chambers, the question would be
presented to the voters for their approval or rejection in a referendum
election. 7 Although the proposed constitutional amendment was
favorably reported out of the House Family and Children's Services
Committee," it met significant partisan opposition on the floor of the
chamber. 19 The resolution's sponsors reportedly agreed to amend the
proposal to protect domestic partnership benefits and to schedule a
special referendum election for August to attract moderate lawmakers
and dampen charges that the resolution was designed primarily to
mobilize voter turnout for President Bush in November. Despite these
apparent concessions, the resolution failed to secure the requisite two-
thirds majority in the house and was therefore never considered by the
senate.2°
This defeat in the legislature prompted the formation of "Citizens
for the Protection of Marriage," a ballot initiative committee seeking to
present the issue of same-sex marriage directly to the voters.2" The
organization mounted a petition drive and quickly obtained more than
500,000 signatures to place its initiative proposal on the November
Michigan legislature already prohibited same-sex marriage. See MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 551.1 (West 2005) ("A marriage contracted between individuals of the same
sex is invalid in this state.").
15. Cf Smith, supra note 2, at 1, 9-12 (examining "how Issue 1, the highly
publicized and successful initiative to ban gay marriage in Ohio, was strategically used
by the Republican party in the 2004 presidential campaign in a critical swing state").
16. See H.J. Res. U, 92d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2004); S.J. Res. E, 92d
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2003).
17. See MICH. CONST. art. XII, § 1.
18. See Peter Luke, House Panel OKs Gay Marriage Ban, GRAND RAPIDS
PRESS, Feb. 25, 2004, at A7.
19. See Gary Heinlein & Charlie Cain, Same-Sex Wedding Ban Fails,
DETROIT NEWS, Mar. 10, 2004, at 1; Stacey Range, Gay Marriage Ban Fails in State
House, LANSING ST. J., Mar. 10, 2004, at 1.
20. See supra note 19.
21. See Dawson Bell, Proposal 2: Gay Marriage Ban Easily Wins in State,
Elsewhere, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Nov. 3, 2004, at 9A.
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ballot.22 This statewide effort was aided by the fact that the members
of numerous religious congregations were encouraged to sign the
petitions before and after worship services.23  The state's Catholic
dioceses also donated the vast majority of the $1.2 million that was
raised for the campaign, and provided parishioners with literature and
videotaped messages endorsing the proposal.24
Prior to the election, opponents of the measure warned that the
proposal's broad language could be interpreted to prohibit employers
from providing health care and other benefits to the domestic partners
of unmarried employees." In response to these concerns,
representatives and allies of Citizens for the Protection of Marriage
repeatedly maintained that the proposed constitutional amendment was
intended to strengthen the state's existing statutory prohibition of same-
sex marriage and that it would not affect domestic partnership benefits.
For example, an official campaign brochure that was distributed by the
organization provided as follows:
Proposal 2 is Only about marriage. Marriage is a union
between husband and wife. Proposal 2 will keep it that way.
This is not about rights or benefits or how people choose to
live their lives .... It merely settles the question once and
for all what marriage is-for families today and future
21generations.
Similarly, Citizens for the Protection of Marriage produced a thirty-
second television commercial for the campaign, which declared:
Proposal 2 isn't about benefits, it just puts the definition of
marriage in our constitution. Judges and politicians couldn't
22. See id,
23. See Marisa Schultz, Churches Join Drive to Ban Gay Marriage, DETROIT
NEWS, June 1, 2004, at 3.
24. See Bell, supra note 21; Charlie Cain, Proposal 2 Would Ban Gay
Marriage in Michigan, DETROIT NEWS, Oct. 26, 2004, at 3. It does not appear that any
of this material mentioned the potential effect of Proposal 2 on domestic partnership
benefits.
25. See supra note 6. The leading opponent of the measure, the Coalition for
a Fair Michigan, reportedly raised about $500,000 for the campaign. See Bell, supra
note 21. The Michigan Chapter of the ACLU also vocally opposed the measure. See
Kaplan & Moss, supra note 7.
26. Compl. for Declaratory Relief 38, Nat'l Pride at Work, Inc. v.
Granholm, No. 265870 (Mar. 21, 2005) (quoting CFPM brochure) (emphasis in
original).
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change it; only voters could .... One man, one woman.
Vote yes, Proposal 2.27
Finally, the campaign director and communications director of the
organization, as well as two of the individuals who were reportedly
involved with drafting the measure, were all quoted in the press
disclaiming the measure's potential effect on domestic partnership
benefits-and, in some cases, dismissing the opposition's warnings as a
"scare tactic" or "diversion from the real issue. , 28
27. This commercial was posted on the official Website of Citizens for the
Protection of Marriage. See http://www.protectmarriageyes.org/Latest.aspx (last
visited Mar. 21, 2005) (transcribed by author).
28. For statements attributed to Marlene Elwell, the campaign director for
Citizens for the Protection of Marriage, see Kyle Melinn, Marriage Supporters Want to
Keep It Simple, CITY PULSE (Lansing, Mich.), Aug. 25, 2004, at 3 ("We're saying
marriage is between one man and one woman. End of story."); id. ("As far as [Elwell]
is concerned, the ballot question doesn't dive into the other questions of domestic
benefits or civil unions . . . ."); Charisse Jones, Gay Marriage on the Ballot in 11
States, USA TODAY, Oct. 15, 2004, at 3A ("This has nothing to do with taking benefits
away. This is about marriage between a man and a woman."). Similarly, Kristina
Hemphill, the communications director for the organization, reportedly stated that
"[tihis amendment has nothing to do with benefits" and claimed that the discussion of
this issue was "just a diversion from the real issue." John Burdick, Marriage Issue
Splits Voters, HOLLAND SENTINEL (Mich.), Oct. 30, 2004; see also Natalie Y. Moore,
Gay Rights Issue Creates Little Stir, DETROIT NEWS, Oct. 27, 2004, at 1 (quoting
Hemphill for the proposition that "[t]his is about defining marriage of one man and one
woman" and responding to the potential elimination of domestic partnership benefits by
claiming that "nothing that's on the books is going to change. We continue to confuse
this issue by bringing in speculation."). Patrick Gillen, an attorney for the Thomas
More Law Center, an organization that allegedly assisted with the drafting of Proposal
2, likewise took the reported position at one time that "benefits are not the issue." See
Catherine O'Donnell, Attack on Gays' Benefits Feared, ANN ARBOR NEWS, Nov. 4,
2004, at 1. Finally, Gary Glenn, the president of the American Family Association of
Michigan, who reportedly co-authored Proposal 2 and was one of its most outspoken
advocates during the campaign, reportedly dismissed the concerns of the opponents at
one point as a "scare tactic" and insisted that "public and private employers could offer
domestic partnership benefits if they want to." Sharon Emery, Proposal 2: Preserving
the Tralitional Family or Threatening the New MUSKEGON CHRONICLE (Mich.), Oct.
24, 2004; see also supra notes 7-9. Although some of Glenn's other reported
comments are consistent with his stated position after the election, he was hardly
forthcoming with the voters on this issue when he had an opportunity to clearly explain
his position. See Gary Glenn, Constitutional Amendment Protects Existing Marital
Laws Against Judicial Activism, DETROIT NEWS, Oct. 24, 2004, at 17 (advocating the
adoption of Proposal 2 without mentioning its potential effect on domestic partnership
benefits); Citizens Research Council of Mich., supra note 6, at 7 ("According to the
American Family Association of Michigan, the clause ['or similar union for any
purpose'] is part of the ballot proposal solely to make the ballot language as strong as
possible."). Glenn has apparently blamed the reported discrepancies on
misunderstandings by the news media. See Range, supra note 9 ("Hours after the
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This particular interpretive question played a central role in the
proceedings of the Board of State Canvassers ("Board"), which is
responsible under state law for certifying the sufficiency of initiative
petitions and approving the "statement of purpose" that actually appears
on election ballots.29 Despite testimony at a Board hearing from an
attorney for the initiative proponents who suggested that Proposal 2
would not prohibit employers from providing domestic partnership
benefits,3 ° the two Democrats on the Board refused to certify the
measure on the grounds that it would invalidate existing employment
benefits and thereby violate certain provisions of the state constitution.31
The same Board members refused to approve the statement of purpose
proposed by the director of elections because the proposed ballot
language did not expressly provide that it could potentially be
interpreted to prohibit domestic partnership benefits.32 Accordingly,
the four-member Board split along partisan lines and fell short of the
three votes needed to approve the proposed ballot language and certify
the proposed constitutional amendment for the November election.33
Citizens for the Protection of Marriage promptly sought a writ of
mandamus from the Michigan Court of Appeals to order the responsible
officials to issue a declaration of the sufficiency of its initiative petition
amendment passed, Glenn blamed confusion on the media, which he said didn't
understand the proposal.").
29. See MICH. CONST. art. XII, § 2; MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 168.32,
168.474, 168.477 (West 2005).
30. Eric Doster, an attorney for the initiative proponents, initially sought to
evade questions about the impact of Proposal 2 on domestic partnership benefits, but
eventually answered, in part, as follows:
If you're asking whether domestic partner benefits that are offered by
contract by municipality or the Big Three would somehow be altered or
affected by this proposal, that's really one for the courts to decide, if and
when this is passed. But I can tell you that no subsequent legislation or
even a constitutional amendment may affect a matter of contract between
two parties. And the domestic benefits to which you are referring to are a
contract between two parties .... That is one-that is one myth that's out
there with respect to this proposal.
Transcript of Testimony of Eric Doster at Hearing Before Board of State Canvassers
(Aug. 23, 2004).
31. See Citizens for Prot. of Marriage v. Bd. of State Canvassers, 688
N.W.2d 538, 540 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004) (stating that two members of the Board
"declined to certify the proposal on the basis of their conclusion that it was unlawful
and unconstitutional"); Dawson Bell, Election 2004.- Tie Vote Keeps Gay Marriage Off
Ballot, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Aug. 24, 2004, at IA (reporting one board member's
position that the nullification of existing domestic partnership benefits would violate the
state constitution and therefore be invalidated by the courts).
32. See Citizens for Prot. of Marriage, 688 N.W.2d at 541.
33. See id.; see also Bell, supra note 21.
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and certify the proposal for the November election.34 The court of
appeals granted the writ based on its conclusion that the Board lacked
the authority to consider the substantive validity of the proposal and
therefore breached its clear legal duty to certify a petition that
substantially complied with applicable statutory requirements and
contained sufficient signatures to warrant certification. 3' The court also
ordered the responsible officials to approve the ballot language
proposed by the director of elections because the statement of purpose
was clearly written and impartial.36 In response to objections from
Board members that the proposed ballot language did not provide
adequate notice of its specific legal consequences, the court pointed out
that "any attempt to determine how courts might eventually apply the
proposed amendment, assuming it won voter approval, would be
entirely speculative. Such speculation would not be a 'true' statement
of the amendment's purpose," and would therefore be incompatible
with applicable provisions of Michigan law. 37  As a result of this
decision, the proposed constitutional amendment was certified to appear
on the general election ballot on November 2, 2004.38
Proposal 2 was approved by approximately fifty-nine percent of
the electorate and therefore easily achieved the majority vote necessary
to amend the state constitution. 39 As soon as the election results were
reported, one of the coauthors of Proposal 2, and perhaps its most
outspoken proponent, reportedly declared that "[blenefits only to
homosexuals are a formal recognition of a homosexual relationship as
34. See Citizens for Prot. of Marriage, 688 N.W.2d at 540. Although the
petitioner requested a writ of mandamus against the Board, the court issued its order
against the Secretary of State because it was convinced "to a reasonable certainty that
there is no reason to believe that the two Board members who voted against the
proposal and the statement of purpose will have a sudden change of heart, regardless of
any order of [the] Court directing them to approve a statement of purpose." Id. at 543.
35. See id. at 541-42.
36. Id. at 542. Under Michigan law, the statement of purpose that appears on
election ballots must "consist of a true and impartial statement of the purpose of the
amendment or question in such language as shall create no prejudice for or against such
proposal." MICH. COMP. LAWs ANN. § 168.474 (West 2005). Moreover, "[tihe
question shall be clearly written using words that have a common everyday meaning to
the general public." Id. § 168.485. Finally, the applicable statute expressly provides
that the ballot language "shall be worded so as to apprise the voters of the subject
matter of the proposal or issue, but need not be legally precise." Id. (emphasis added).
37. Citizens for Prot. of Marriage, 688 N.W.2d at 542 (citing MICH. CONST.
art. XII, § 2; MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 168.474).
38. Id. at 543.
39. See 2004 Mich. Legis. Serv. A-I (West); see also MICH. CONST. art. XII,
§ 2 (providing that a majority vote of the electorate is necessary to adopt an initiated
constitutional amendment); Range, supra note 9 (reporting that Proposal 2 was
approved by fifty-nine percent of those who cast votes on the measure).
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equal or similar to marriage .... And the voters have said they don't
want that."4° In response to charges that he was reversing the position
that he took prior to the election, this proponent reportedly "blamed
confusion on the media, which he said didn't understand the
proposal." 41  This proponent also reportedly claimed that any
employers found to be in violation of the new amendment would be
"turned over" to the attorney general of Michigan.42
Although some of Proposal 2's proponents have stayed out of the
postelection fray on this issue or maintained their earlier positions,"
other proponents and their allies have sought to use the constitutional
amendment's broad language to prohibit public employers from
granting domestic partnership benefits." For example, the Thomas
More Law Center, which filed a lawsuit challenging the City of Ann
Arbor's provision of health care benefits to the domestic partners of
gay and lesbian employees prior to the election, amended its pleadings
after the election to claim that the enactment of Proposal 2 rendered
such domestic partnership benefits unconstitutional." An attorney for
the organization, who was previously quoted disclaiming the
amendment's impact on this issue, 46 has reportedly claimed more
recently that Proposal 2 prevents public employers from providing
domestic partnership benefits because such a policy recognizes a
relationship similar to marriage."7
40. Range, supra note 9.
41. Id. This initiative proponent reportedly explained that "he interprets the
language to mean domestic partner benefits now must be extended to all public
employees who share their households." Id.
42. Id.
43. Marlene Elwell, the campaign director of Citizens for the Protection of
Marriage, has reportedly said that she "hasn't paid attention" to the debate over
domestic partnership benefits since the amendment's approval. See Thomas P.
Morgan, To Unsecure These Blessings... Proposal 2 Sows Fear As It Becomes Law,
CITy PULSE (Lansing, Mich.), Dec. 15, 2004, at 1. She added, however, "that the
proposal was not intended to address the issue of domestic partnership benefits." Id.
"'It was just to get marriage to be between one man and one woman,' Elwell says.
'The benefits thing was not something we ever discussed, and it was not a part of our
issue.'" Id.
44. See supra notes 7-9, 40-42 and accompanying text (describing the
apparent discrepancies in Gary Glenn's reported statements on this issue).
45. See David Eggert, Lawsuit Challenges Ann Arbor Schools' Same-Sex
Benefits, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 7, 2005.
46. See O'Donnell, supra note 28 (quoting Patrick Gillen).
47. See Eggert, supra note 45. Gillen reportedly told the Associated Press,
"It is akin to marriage. The Ann Arbor Schools can't recognize same-sex marriages by
calling them domestic partnerships." Id. The Michigan Court of Appeals recently
upheld a decision to grant summary judgment in favor of the defendants in this case
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Regardless of how courts ultimately interpret Proposal 2, it has
already had a negative impact on the availability of domestic
partnership benefits for public employees in Michigan. Shortly before
the November 2004 election, the state reached a tentative agreement
with five unions that would have provided domestic partnership benefits
for represented employees.48 The ratification of this agreement was
postponed, however, because the governor and other state and union
officials were reportedly concerned that offering domestic partnership
benefits to public employees could potentially violate Proposal 2.
These officials claimed they wanted definitive guidance from the
judiciary before providing domestic partnership benefits to public
employees once the constitutional amendment was enacted.50
In response to the request of a state legislator, the attorney general
of Michigan subsequently issued a formal advisory opinion declaring
that a municipality's policy of providing benefits to the domestic
partners of gay and lesbian employees conflicts with the plain meaning
of Proposal 2."' The attorney general reasoned that "marriage" is
commonly understood as "'the legal union of one man and one woman
as husband and wife.' 5 2  Moreover, the declared purpose of the
constitutional amendment was "to secure and preserve the benefits of
marriage for society and our children."53  Because the health-care
based on the plaintiffs' failure to establish standing. See Rohde v. Ann Arbor Pub.
Sch., 698 N.W.2d 402 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005).
48. See Chris Andrews, Prop 2 May Threaten State's Plan to Offer Gay-
Partner Benefits, LANSING ST. J., Nov. 11, 2004, at 1.
49. See id.; see also Bad Deal: Granholm, Unions Don't Earn Praise for
Same-Sex Maneuvers, LANSING ST. J., Dec. 5, 2004, at 10; Chris Andrews, State
Unions A wait Ruling on Same-Sex Issue, LANSING ST. J., Dec. 3, 2004, at 1; Governor
to Remove Same-Sex Benefits from State Contracts, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec. 2, 2004.
50. See supra note 49; see also Aftershocks: Proposal 2"s Full Effects Will Be
Defined by the Courts, LANSING ST. J., Nov. 17, 2004, at 8 (stating that "any legal
challenge to [domestic partnership benefits] would provide one critical public service:
clarify exactly what Proposal 2 does to people in Michigan").
51. See Same-Sex Domestic Partnership Benefits, supra note 10, at 3-4
(stating that "the primary rule of construction is to give effect to the intent of the people
of the State of Michigan who ratified the Constitution by applying the rule of 'common
understanding,'" and explaining that "the common understanding of constitutional text
is understood by applying each term's plain meaning at the time of ratification").
52. Id. at 9 (quoting Black's Law Dictionary and citing other statutory
provisions and legal precedent).
53. Id. The attorney general further stated:
It is reasonable to conclude that average citizens when casting their votes at
the November 2004 election commonly understood that, to secure and
preserve to our society the benefits derived from the institution of marriage,
Proposal 04-2 would reserve that unique recognition to the union of one
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benefits at issue are routinely provided to an employee's spouse, they
are a benefit of marriage. 4 Accordingly, a public employer's provision
of those benefits to an employee's domestic partner would constitute the
"recognition" of "a similar union for any purpose."55 In reaching this
conclusion, the attorney general expressly relied upon the "plain
language of the amendment" and the canon of interpretation that seeks
to give meaning to every textual provision. 6 In other words, the
attorney general suggested that his interpretation of Proposal 2 was
necessary to avoid rendering the broad, catch-all phrase "similar union
for any purpose" superfluous.
Although the attorney general concluded that his interpretation was
compelled by the plain meaning of Proposal 2, he also claimed that the
context in which the amendment was adopted further supported his
decision. In particular, he pointed out that Proposal 2 was widely
discussed in the media prior to the election and that its potential legal
consequences for domestic partnership benefits were a central feature of
the debate." Moreover, he expressly recognized that "[tihe difference
in interpretation among the various views expressed on the subject was
attributable to the clause 'or similar union for any purpose' and the
effect the clause would have on domestic partner benefits if the
amendment passed."58 The attorney general therefore concluded that
man and one woman in marriage and not allow its extension to similar
unions.
Id. at 12. This statement is a non sequitur because "securing and preserving" the
benefits of marriage does not necessarily require denying those benefits to unmarried
individuals or couples. Accordingly, the attorney general apparently believes that
'average citizens" would have adopted this faulty reasoning when casting their votes.
In any event, it is not clear how a prohibition of domestic partnership benefits furthers
the self-declared purpose of Proposal 2.
54. Id. at 10-11 (identifying "legal or financial benefits associated with
marriage").
55. Id. at 12-15. The attorney general expressly recognized two important
limitations on his opinion. First, he concluded that Proposal 2 does not invalidate
existing contractual obligations of governmental employers because it only applies
prospectively to future employment contracts. See id. at 16-17. Second, he opined that
Proposal 2 would not prevent a public employer "from conferring benefits on persons a
city employee may wish to designate as a recipient as long as the benefits are not
dependent on the existence of a union that is similar to a marriage as defined by
Michigan law." Id at 16. At least one initiative proponent has used these
qualifications as a basis for reconciling his statements before and after the election. See
supra notes 7-9, 28, 40-42 and accompanying text (describing the reported role of Gary
Glenn and statements that were attributed to him prior to the election).
56. See Same-Sex Domestic Partnership Benefits, supra note 10, at 14.
57. Seeid at 13-14.
58. Id. at 14 (citing Citizens Research Council of Mich., supra note 6).
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voters were on notice that the amendment's enactment might invalidate
domestic partnership benefits:
Looking at the circumstances surrounding adoption of
Proposal 2, therefore, the issue of domestic partner benefits
based on a union similar to marriage was at the forefront of
the public debate as voters prepared to go to the polls.
Regardless of whether there was agreement regarding the
effect the proposal might have on domestic partner benefits,
one thing that would clearly have been evident to voters was
that benefits provided based on the recognition of a "similar
union" were at issue and might be eliminated if the measure
passed.59
The foregoing description of the circumstances surrounding
Proposal 2 is accurate as far as it goes, but the attorney general's
opinion conspicuously failed to acknowledge that the measure's
proponents repeatedly denied that the measure would affect domestic
partnership benefits, and dismissed such concerns as a "scare tactic" or
"diversion from the real issue. "' His opinion is, nonetheless, arguably
binding on all public employers in the state in the absence of an
authoritative judicial decision to the contrary.61
And, indeed, a judicial decision to the contrary was briefly in
place when a state trial court granted a litigant's request for a
declaratory judgment that Proposal 2 "does not prohibit public
employers from entering into contractual agreements with their
employees to provide domestic partner benefits or voluntarily providing
domestic partner benefits as a matter of policy." 62 The decision was
entered in an action that was filed against the governor by the ACLU
Fund of Michigan on behalf of numerous public employees who were
in danger of losing their domestic partnership benefits as a result of the
attorney general's interpretation of the constitutional amendment.63 The
59. Id.
60. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
61. See Mich. Beer & Wine Wholesalers Ass'n v. Att'y Gen., 370 N.W.2d
328, 331 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985) (noting that attorney general opinions do not have the
force of law and are therefore not binding on courts, but they are binding on state
agencies and officers). It is not clear, however, whether the attorney general's opinion
is binding on the University of Michigan, Michigan State University, or Wayne State
University because these institutions have a unique status under the state constitution.
See MICH. CONST. art. VIII, § 5.
62. See Nat'l Pride at Work, Inc. v. Granholm, 2005 WL 3048040, at *7
(Mich. Cir. Ct. 2005).
63. See Compl. for Declaratory Relief, Nat'l Pride at Work, Inc. v.
Granholm, No. 265870 (Mar. 21, 2005).
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central allegation of the plaintiffs was that the voters who enacted
Proposal 2 "did not intend to deprive health care coverage and other
employment related benefits to domestic partners of government
employees and their children. "64
In contrast to the attorney general's opinion, the trial court found
that the "plain meaning" of Proposal 2 did not prohibit public
employers from providing domestic partnership benefits.65 First, the
court explained that domestic partnership benefits stem from the
provisions of an employment contract and are therefore "not among the
statutory rights or benefits of marriage. "' Second, the court reasoned
that the criteria for awarding domestic partnership benefits do not
"recognize a union" because civil unions and same-sex marriage are
prohibited in the State of Michigan, which in turn suggests that there is
no "union" that could be "recognized. ,67 Third, the court concluded
that the criteria for awarding domestic partnership benefits do not
recognize a union "similar to marriage" because marriage involves
numerous rights and obligations that are not implicated by an
employer's provision of domestic partnership benefits.68 Finally, the
court explained that the "for any purpose" language of Proposal 2 was
64. Id. at 18. The plaintiffs also claimed that their proposed interpretation
should be adopted in order to avoid potential conflicts with other provisions of the state
constitution. See id. at 19-20. The governor, who was sued in her official capacity,
filed a response to the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment that joined in their
request for declaratory relief. See Nat'l Pride at Work, 2005 WL 3048040, at *1.
Although numerous amici also supported the plaintiffs, the attorney general intervened
as a defendant and argued that Proposal 2 prohibited public employers from providing
domestic partnership benefits. See id.
65. See Nat'l Pride at Work, 2005 WL 3048040, at *3-4 (finding that the
"[i]ntent of the people" who enacted Proposal 2 "is contained in the very language of
the amendment ... because the words used have a common meaning").
66. Id. at *4.
67. See id. at *4-5. Although this reasoning appears circular, the court
claimed that the attorney general's interpretation would effectively "disregard the word
'union' and instead prohibit receipt of health care benefits based on any employer-
defined set of criteria between two people of the same gender." Id. at *5. The court
then stepped away from the "plain meaning" of the text to provide what may have been
its most astute observation:
There is nothing in the amendment that evidences the intent of the people to
go beyond disallowing same sex marriage and civil unions to preventing
employers from voluntarily providing health insurance benefits to those who
meet certain criteria that the employer has established.
Id.; cf infra Part III.B (endorsing interpretive techniques that narrowly construe
ambiguous ballot measures in appropriate circumstances).
68. See Natl Pride at Work, 2005 WL 3048040, at *5. The court also relied
upon judicial decisions in several other jurisdictions, which "held that the domestic
partner relationship was not similar to marriage, with all of its rights and
responsibilities." Id. at *6 (citations omitted).
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inapplicable to the benefits at issue because the public employers did
not recognize a "union similar to marriage."69
About a month later, the Michigan Court of Appeals entered an
order that established an expedited briefing schedule and agreed to
provide "immediate consideration" of this matter.7" In addition, the
court granted the attorney general's motion for a stay of the trial court's
decision. The court explained that the effect of the stay would be "to
preserve the status quo" that existed on the day before the trial court's
decision,71 thereby reinvigorating the attorney general's opinion. Thus,
at least for the time being, it appears that the proponents of Proposal 2
and their allies have achieved the bait-and-switch in direct democracy.
The attorney general's opinion will, however, not be the last word
on this issue. Instead, the Supreme Court of Michigan will likely make
the final decision on whether Proposal 2 prohibits public employers
from providing domestic partnership benefits, regardless of the decision
of the court of appeals. Although the final chapter of this story remains
to be written, one might be skeptical that the trial court's view of the
"plain meaning" of Proposal 2 will be shared by an unabashedly
conservative court if and when it applies its textualist methodology of
interpretation.7
2
II. STRUCTURAL FLAWS OF THE INITIATIVE PROCESS
It may be tempting to dismiss the story of Proposal 2 as merely a
tawdry tale of politics in Michigan. These events deserve serious
consideration, however, for those concerned about democratic structure
because the existing initiative process facilitates the bait-and-switch in
direct democracy. In particular, the technique is made possible by a
combination of several distinct characteristics of this form of
lawmaking. First, although ballot measures may be approved or
rejected by the electorate, the initiative proponents are the driving force
behind drafting their specific text, qualifying them for the ballot, and
69. See id. at *6.
70. See Order, Nat'l Pride at Work, Inc. v. Granholm, No. 265870 (Mich.
Ct. App. Oct. 31, 2005).
71. Seeid.
72. See Maura D. Corrigan & J. Michael Thomas, "Dice Loading" Rules of
Statutory Interpretation, 59 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 231, 233, 237-42 (2003)
(claiming that "the Michigan Supreme Court has recently moved toward a textualist
approach that consciously avoids use of dice-loading rules" and that recent cases
"reflect that statutory interpretation in Michigan adheres to the principles consistently
articulated by Justice Scalia"). Corrigan is currently the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court of Michigan.
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lobbying the electorate to vote in their favor.73 Second, the initiative
proponents are typically precluded from amending the text of a measure
once their petitions have been circulated, even if potential errors,
ambiguities, or "collateral consequences" are brought to their attention
prior to the election.74 Finally, there are few procedures in place to
require structured deliberation about the meaning or advisability of a
proposed measure and virtually no formal mechanisms for binding the
initiative proponents to what they say.75 Even when the initiative
proponents do not overtly mislead the electorate about the intended
consequences of their measure, the same structural features increase the
risk that successful ballot measures will have collateral consequences
that were never anticipated or approved by the voters.
Although the details of the ballot initiative process vary by
jurisdiction, Michigan's procedures for adopting an initiated
constitutional amendment are typical for present purposes.76 First, the
73. See Staszewski, supra note 3, at 420-32 (describing the role of initiative
proponents); see also Philip P. Frickey, Interpretation on the Borderline: Constitution,
Canons, Direct Democracy, 1996 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 477, 519 (recognizing that
"[d]irect democracy consists of two separate processes: proposal by well-organized
interests and ratification by the electorate"); Jane S. Schacter, The Pursuit of "Popular
Intent." Interpretive Dilemmas in Direct Democracy, 105 YALE L.J. 107, 111 (1995)
(explaining that "the direct lawmaking process gives powerful leverage to initiative
drafters, who are situated to construct a phantom popular intent through strategic
drafting").
74. See DAVID B. MAGLEBY, DIRECT LEGISLATION: VOTING ON BALLOT
PROPOSITIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 184 (1984) (explaining that because the initiative
process forecloses amendment, voters must affirm or reject ballot propositions in toto);
Kenneth P. Miller, Constraining Populism: The Real Challenge of Initiative Reform, 41
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1037, 1052 (2001) (recognizing that after the ballot petition is
circulated for signatures, "the measure cannot be amended again, even by the
proponents, even if it becomes apparent that the measure contains a flaw that should be
corrected").
75. See Philip P. Frickey, The Communion of Strangers: Representative
Government, Direct Democracy, and the Privatization of the Public Sphere, 34
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 421, 435-37 (1998) (explaining that direct democracy offers no
alternative to the opportunities for deliberation that are provided by the legislative
process and pointing out that "whatever might be said at public meetings can have no
effect on the measure's language"); see also infra Part III.A (claiming that existing
procedural safeguards are flawed because they do not adequately resolve textual
ambiguity prior to a ballot election).
76. The Michigan Constitution provides that constitutional amendments may
be proposed "by petition of the registered electors of this state." MICH. CONST. art.
XII, § 2. A constitutional amendment that is adopted pursuant to this process, such as
Proposal 2, is known as a "direct initiative" because private citizens are allowed to
make binding laws completely outside of the traditional legislative process. See
Staszewski, supra note 3, at 396 & n.2 (describing different types of direct democracy).
The Michigan Constitution also authorizes the promulgation of statutes pursuant to the
"indirect initiative," whereby private citizens are allowed to refer proposed ballot
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proponents of a measure are required to circulate initiative petitions that
set forth their proposal and obtain signatures from registered voters
equal to at least ten percent of the votes cast in the prior gubernatorial
election.77 The proponents must subsequently file the requisite petitions
with the secretary of state at least 120 days before the targeted
election." When this occurs, the director of elections and a bipartisan
Board of State Canvassers are responsible for preparing a brief and
impartial statement of the proposition's purpose.79 The Board must also
issue a declaration of the sufficiency or insufficiency of the initiative
petitions at least two months before the targeted election.8° If the Board
certifies the sufficiency of the petitions,8 copies of the proposition's
statement of purpose are distributed to the media and placed on the next
election ballot.82 If the proposition is approved by a majority of the
qualified electors who cast votes on the question, the proposition is
officially incorporated into the state constitution.83
Despite widespread rhetoric that direct democracy constitutes
lawmaking by "the people," the initiative proponents are the dominant
force in successful ballot campaigns.84 As explained above, they
conceive of a measure and draft its precise text, and they are directly
responsible for obtaining the petition signatures necessary to qualify a
measure for the ballot. The proponents, of course, routinely lead the
campaign to persuade the electorate to vote in favor of the measure.
Finally, they participate in litigation and lobbying to encourage public
officials to make favorable decisions about the measure before the
measures to the legislature for consideration. If the legislature fails to enact the
proposal after forty days, the measure is subsequently presented to the voters. See
MICH. CONST. art. II, § 9. Nineteen states allow private citizens to enact constitutional
amendments, statutes, or both pursuant to the direct initiative, which is the primary
focus of this Article. See M. DANE WATERS, INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM ALMANAC
11-12 (2003) (describing initiative procedures that are currently available).
77. See MICH. CONST. art. XII, § 2.
78. See id.; MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 168.471 (West 2005).
79. See MICH. CONST. art. XII, § 2; MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 168.474
(West 2005).
80. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 168.477 (West 2005).
81. An aggrieved party may obtain judicial review of the Board's certification
decisions prior to the election pursuant to a writ of mandamus or certiorari. See id. §
168.479; see also supra notes 29-38 and accompanying text (describing the proceedings
before the Board of State Canvassers and subsequent litigation regarding Proposal 2).
82. See MICH. CONST. art. XII, § 2; see also MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§
168.477, 168.481, 168.485 (West 2005).
83. See MICH. CONST. art. XII, § 2.
84. See supra note 73; see also DAVID S. BRODER, DEMOCRACY DERAILED:
INITIATIVE CAMPAIGNS AND THE POWER OF MONEY 91-161 (2000) (describing the
"initiative war in close-up").
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election, and when it is subsequently implemented.85 At each stage of
this process, the proponents are routinely assisted by professional
members of the "initiative industry."86 The proponents and their
consultants, together, are capable of conducting sophisticated research
on the existing legal landscape in order to draft a measure to achieve
their intended results with an eye toward future judicial review.87 In
addition, it is not unusual for them to use focus groups and conduct
polls to determine how to effectively promote or "spin" their measure
to the voters.88 Not surprisingly, a successful ballot campaign,
particularly at the statewide level, costs the initiative proponents and
their supporters huge sums of money."
Political scientists have recognized that initiative proponents often
have incentives to draft ballot measures in a vague or ambiguous
fashion because more specific proposals tend to be easier to criticize
and perhaps subsequently defeat.' While those incentives are not
85. See ELISABETH R. GERBER, THE POPULIST PARADOX: INTEREST GROUP
INFLUENCE AND THE PROMISE OF DIRECT LEGISLATION 44-45 (1999); David McCuan et
al., California's Political Warriors: Campaign Professionals and the Initiative Process,
in CITIZENS AS LEGISLATORS 55, 70 (Shaun Bowler et al. eds., 1998). Governmental
officials are sometimes reluctant to faithfully implement successful ballot measures that
they opposed in the traditional legislative process. See ELISABETH R. GERBER ET AL.,
STEALING THE INITIATIVE: How STATE GOVERNMENT RESPONDS TO DIRECT DEMOCRACY
(2001). The bait-and-switch in direct democracy is therefore most likely to occur when
executive or judicial officials share the policy preferences of initiative proponents on
issues that would likely engender opposition in the legislature.
86. For descriptions of this industry, see BRODER, supra note 84, at 43-89;
MAGLEBY, supra note 74, at 59-76; McCuan et al., supra note 85, at 55-70; see also
Elizabeth Garrett, Money, Agenda Setting, and Direct Democracy, 77 TEX. L. REv.
1845, 1851 (1999) ("Providing professional signature gatherers is one of the many
services offered by the growing initiative industry, which consists of political
professionals who assist groups in obtaining the required number of signatures, meeting
legal and procedural challenges to ballot access, and managing the campaign itself.").
87. See Frickey, supra note 73, at 519 (recognizing that "[u]nlike the
electorate as a whole, many of the active participants ... are frequent 'players' in the
repeat game of direct democracy" who can be expected to pay attention to judicial
decisions); Elizabeth Garrett, Who Directs Direct Democracy?, 4 U. CHI. ROUNDTABLE
17, 30 (1997) (explaining that "ballot proposals are drafted by repeat players who can
learn the rules of statutory interpretation and behave accordingly").
88. See BRODER, supra note 84, at 71-83.
89. See id. at 163-64 (providing data on initiative spending and describing a
record-setting initiative election in which competing gaming interests spent $92
million); GERBER, supra note 85, at 4-5 (providing data on "the enormous level of
spending in direct legislation campaigns"); MAGLEBY, supra note 74, at 149 tbl.8.2
(providing data on campaign spending for ballot initiatives in California from 1958 until
1982).
90. See GERBER ET AL., supra note 85, at 110 (explaining that "some initiative
proponents may have no choice but to write an initiative in vague or ambiguous
language" if they want their measure to be approved by the voters).
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unique to the ballot initiative process, they undoubtedly increase the
risk that successful ballot measures will have collateral consequences
that were not anticipated or approved by the voters. Moreover, several
structural flaws of the ballot initiative process significantly exacerbate
this problem and facilitate the bait-and-switch in direct democracy.
First, it is particularly easy for the initiative proponents to "dodge"
issues during ballot campaigns because there are few opportunities for
structured deliberation and debate in this lawmaking process.9 Aside
from filing their initiative petitions, the only time proponents are even
invited to make "official" statements on behalf of their measure in
Michigan is when the director of elections and Board of State
Canvassers develop a proposal's statement of purpose-and, even then,
the initiative proponents are not necessarily compelled to participate.'
While some jurisdictions also hold legislative hearings or produce ballot
pamphlets that routinely provide the views of initiative proponents,93
these tools are not readily capable of forcing the initiative proponents to
adopt clear positions on potentially divisive or problematic interpretive
issues. Even if lawmakers or other interested parties posed searching
questions at public hearings, there would be little to prevent the
proponents from giving nonresponsive, evasive, or misleading answers.
Statements in ballot pamphlets, like other forms of campaign
advertising, can only produce candid information about specific
interpretive issues of this nature on a purely voluntary basis. Yet, it is
precisely this type of one-sided advertising that appears most likely to
reach voters during a ballot campaign.94
91. See supra note 75.
92. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 168.22e(2) (West 2005) (providing that
"[tihe board of state canvassers shall publicly request ad allow" the sponsor of a ballot
initiative "to address a meeting" to consider and approve its statement of purpose); see
also MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 168.844-45 (1999) (setting forth governing regulations for
the conduct of public meetings and hearings of the Board).
93. See WATERS, supra note 76, at 24-26 (providing information about the
availability and general content of ballot pamphlets); id. at 294 (reporting that hearings
are conducted by the Secretary of State on proposed ballot measures in each
congressional district of Nebraska and that initiative proponents and opponents are
invited to participate).
94. See SHAUN BOWLER & TODD DONOVAN, DEMANDING CHOICES: OPINION,
VOTING, AND DIRECT DEMOCRACY 56-59 (1998) (describing the results of surveys on
voter information in ballot campaigns and reporting that a majority of voters use ballot
pamphlets and that most of them find the arguments for and against a measure most
helpful); Michael S. Kang, Democratizing Direct Democracy.- Restoring Voter
Competence Through Heuristic Cues and "Disclosure Plus," 50 UCLA L. REV. 1141,
1169 (2003) (recognizing that most voters receive their information about politics
"from their casual viewing of television advertising and news"); Schacter, supra note
73, at 130-44 (canvassing social science literature regarding the influences on voter
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The ease with which initiative proponents can dodge potentially
problematic or divisive interpretive issues limits their need to deny that
particular collateral consequences were intended. The initiative
proponents will, however, sometimes have political incentives to
voluntarily address interpretive issues of this nature during a ballot
campaign.95 The provision of such "interpretive guidance" will not
necessarily foreclose the bait-and-switch in direct democracy, however,
because there are no formal structural mechanisms for binding the
initiative proponents to what they say.96  Indeed, the initiative
proponents may have every incentive to take a "moderate" position on
interpretive issues prior to an election in order to increase their
likelihood of success at the polls. They may retain an equally strong
incentive, however, to adopt a more "extreme" or perhaps contrary
position after the election when successful ballot measures are
interpreted and implemented by executive and judicial officials. If
those officials interpret a measure narrowly to accord with their pre-
election views, the initiative proponents have lost nothing. On the
other hand, governmental officials could conceivably adopt a broader
interpretation of the measure and thereby complete the bait-and-switch
in direct democracy. In the absence of some tangible basis for
discouraging this type of behavior, the initiative proponents (and their
allies) have structural incentives to change their positions on potentially
contentious interpretive issues-to "flip-flop," so to speak-once an
election has occurred. 97
behavior in ballot elections and reporting that media accounts and advertising are the
most influential sources of information).
95. See GERBER, supra note 85, at 56 (explaining that the opponents of ballot
measures "may design their campaigns to emphasize and cultivate uncertainty about a
proposition," and the initiative proponents must, in turn, "mitigate concerns about all
aspects of the measure").
96. See Frickey, supra note 75; mfa Part IV (comparing direct democracy to
the traditional legislative process). It is therefore not surprising that political
advertising during ballot campaigns is notoriously simplistic and misleading. See, e.g.,
Eule, supra note 3, at 1517 (claiming that "[i]llustrations of deceptive advertising and
sloganeering abound" in ballot campaigns); Daniel H. Lowenstein, Campaign Spending
and Ballot Propositions: Recent Experience, Public Choice Theory and the First
Amendment, 29 UCLA L. REv. 505, 570 (1982) (stating that ballot campaigns are
"marked by gross exaggeration, distortion, and outright deception").
97. The opponents of proposed ballot measures often have the same incentives
running in the opposite direction. Thus, for example, the opponents of Proposal 2
warned that it could be construed to prohibit public employers from providing domestic
partnership benefits, but they are currently seeking a narrow interpretation of the
measure that would avoid this outcome. See supra notes 25, 62-64 and accompanying
text. By clarifying the particular legal consequences of proposed ballot measures prior
to an election, the reforms that are endorsed in this Article would limit this type of
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The ability of the initiative proponents to dodge issues and
strategically change their positions is uniquely reinforced by other
structural features of the ballot initiative process. For example, the
unelected status of initiative proponents and the one-shot nature of
ballot campaigns limit the need for most participants to develop and
maintain trustworthy reputations.98 Perhaps more important, the text of
a proposed initiative cannot be amended after its proponents have begun
circulating signature petitions to qualify the measure for the ballot.99
Proponents are therefore prohibited from correcting textual errors or
making other changes that would clarify or improve the drafting of
proposed legislation.' 0° They are also precluded from accommodating
any substantive concerns that arise during the ballot campaign and
thereby facilitating compromise or consensus among interested
parties. 01  Beyond the questionable wisdom of foreclosing such
opportunities, prohibitions on amendment prevent the opponents of a
ballot measure from even asking the initiative proponents to "put their
money where their mouth is" by agreeing to textual changes that would
resolve any unnecessary ambiguity and thereby take potential collateral
consequences off the table.
The foregoing structural features of the ballot initiative process
combine to facilitate the bait-and-switch in direct democracy. The
initiative proponents can qualify a popular idea for the ballot and
intentionally draft the measure in sufficiently broad or ambiguous terms
to create particular "collateral consequences." At the same time, the
proponents can routinely dodge questions about the precise meaning of
their proposal during the ballot campaign. When this strategy is not
feasible, the proponents can always change their position after the
election because there are no structural mechanisms to bind the
initiative proponents to what they have previously said. Specifically,
strategic manipulation by both sides of an initiative campaign and thereby encourage
reasoned deliberation about the merits of a proposal. See infra Parts III.B-C & IV.
98. See GERBER, supra note 85, at 18 ("[Mlany of the interest groups involved
in direct legislation form for the purpose of supporting or opposing a single proposition
and disband soon after the voting occurs.").
99. Initiative proponents must apparently start a new petition drive if they
want to change the text of a proposed ballot measure in Michigan. See MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 168.475(2) (West 2005) ("After the day on which a petition under this
chapter is filed, the secretary of state shall not accept further filings of that petition to
supplement the original filing.").
100. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
101. See Eule, supra note 3, at 1556 (recognizing that "[m]ajoritarian
preferences cannot be softened or diluted by political compromise" in the initiative
process); Garrett, supra note 87, at 31 (explaining that the opponents of a ballot
measure "cannot seek compromise to accommodate their concerns ... because the text
of a proposal cannot be changed once it has been placed on the ballot").
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prohibitions on amendment preclude the initiative proponents from
incorporating their "campaign promises" on specific interpretive issues
into the text of a measure. As a result, they-and, especially, their
independent allies-can freely engage in litigation or other lobbying
activities to encourage governmental officials to interpret the measure
broadly in a contrary fashion. The same structural features render the
ballot initiative process particularly vulnerable to collateral
consequences that were not anticipated or approved by the voters, even
when the bait-and-switch in direct democracy was not premeditated by
the initiative proponents or even consciously invoked.
III. AVOIDING THE BAIT-AND-SWITCH IN DIRECT DEMOCRACY
The widespread appeal of direct democracy stems primarily from
its potential capacity to accurately reflect the will of the people. 12
Critics have pointed out, however, that the -ballot initiative process
foregoes the safeguards of representation and bicameralism and
presentment, which the traditional legislative process provides to
protect political minorities and ensure that lawmaking is the product of
reasoned deliberation. 10 3  At first blush, the bait-and-switch in direct
democracy appears problematic from both normative perspectives
because it allows initiative proponents to mislead voters about the
particular consequences of a proposed ballot measure. The technique
therefore undermines the ability of voters to accurately express their
preferences and inhibits reasoned deliberation during the lawmaking
process. The same shortcomings potentially exist whenever ballot
initiatives have particular legal consequences that were not expressly
endorsed by the voters. Fortunately, there are some readily available
tools for avoiding the bait-and-switch in direct democracy and limiting
the collateral consequences of successful ballot measures.
102. See Sherman J. Clark, A Populist Critique of Direct Democracy, 112
HARV. L. REv. 434, 435-36 (1998) (explaining that the assumption that direct
democracy provides the clearest expression of "the voice of the people ... is at the
heart of the populist case for direct democracy"); Richard B. Collins & Dale Oesterle,
Structuring the Ballot Initiative Process: Procedures that Do and Don't Work, 66 U.
COLO. L. REv. 47, 58 (1995) ("An important variant of the concept that the initiative is
a perfection of democracy is the claim that the initiative allows expression of pure
majoritarian will, and that this is a virtue.").
103. See, e.g., Derrick A. Bell, Jr., The Referendum: Democracy's Barrier to
Racial Equality, 54 WASH. L. REv. 1 (1978); Eule, supra note 3; Marci A. Hamilton,
The People: The Least Accountable Branch, 4 U. CHI. ROUNDTABLE 1 (1997); Hans A.
Linde, When Initiative Lawmaking Is Not "Republican Government". The Campaign
Against Homosexuality, 72 OR. L. REv. 19 (1993); Staszewski, supra note 3, at 395.
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A. Existing Procedural Safeguards
Before describing legal reforms that could eliminate the bait-and-
switch in direct democracy and limit the collateral consequences of
successful ballot measures, it is worth considering whether the existing
procedural safeguards that some jurisdictions currently employ are
sufficient to defeat these problems. Specifically, most jurisdictions
already have procedures in place that are designed to provide ballot
measures with clear, concise, and accurate titles and summaries, which
are conveyed to the voters on initiative petitions and election ballots.
1 14
In addition, some jurisdictions provide registered voters with ballot
pamphlets that contain objective descriptions of proposed initiative
measures, along with statements of support and opposition.,0 5 Finally,
a majority of jurisdictions that authorize the direct initiative limit the
scope of each ballot measure to a "single subject" to avoid potential
surprise or confusion and prevent the enactment of independently
unsupported provisions.' °6 This section explains that such procedures
may perform useful functions, but they are insufficient to avoid the
bait-and-switch in direct democracy and minimize the collateral
consequences of successful ballot measures. This is because the
procedures do not adequately resolve textual ambiguity before an
election and therefore do not genuinely clarify the specific
consequences of proposed ballot measures for the voters.
The most obvious example of the failure of existing procedures to
clarify the specific consequences of proposed ballot measures is
provided by jurisdictions that wait to enforce single-subject rules until
after an initiative has been enacted.107 This approach does not directly
104. See WATERS, supra note 76, at 16-17.
105. See id at 24-26; see also Peter Brien, Voter Pamphlets: The Next Best
Step in Election Reform, 28 J. LEGIS. 87 (2002).
106. See generally Anne G. Campbell, In the Eye of the Beholder. The Single
Subject Rule for Ballot Initiatives, in THE BATTLE OVER CITIZEN LAWMAKING 131, 131-
64 (M. Dane Waters ed., 2001); Rachael Downey et al., A Survey of the Single
Subject Rule as Applied to Statewide Initiatives, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 579
(2004). For example, the Michigan Constitution provides that "[n]o law shall embrace
more than one object, which shall be expressed in its title." MICH. CONST. art. IV, §
24. Because this provision is understood to apply only to statutory initiatives and not to
initiated constitutional amendments, it will most likely not serve as a potential basis for
invalidating Proposal 2. See Downey et al., supra, at 603.
107. See, e.g., Forum for Equal. PAC v. City of New Orleans, 881 So. 2d
777, 782-83 (La. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that- in the absence of "unquestionabl[e]"
invalidity, an alleged violation of the state's single-subject rule should only be resolved
if and when the proposal is ultimately enacted); Beechnau v. Austin, 201 N.W.2d 699,
701 (Mich. Ct. App. 1972) (holding that an alleged violation of the state's single-
subject rule for statutory initiatives was premature because the court "will not pass
upon the constitutionality of a proposed law before it is submitted to the people").
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clarify the particular consequences of ballot initiatives before an
election. If anything, the possibility that successful ballot measures
could subsequently be modified or invalidated based on single-subject
violations provides initiative proponents with incentives to formulate
titles and statements of purpose at very high levels of abstraction.' s
The postelection enforcement of single-subject rules is therefore
unlikely to prevent voter surprise or confusion about the particular
consequences of successful ballot measures. Although this approach
could avoid collateral consequences that were arguably unsupported by
a majority of voters, °9 the same function would be performed more
effectively by the adoption of appropriate interpretive techniques when
the applicable text is ambiguous.'10 Moreover, it is difficult to see how
the judiciary could competently second-guess the electorate's apparent
preferences when an initiative's text plainly resolves an issue."' These
considerations, along with the notorious difficulty of establishing a
coherent standard for identifying a "single subject,""' suggest that
108. See, e.g., Forum for Equal. PAC v. McKeithen, 893 So. 2d 715, 736
(La. 2005) (upholding a constitutional amendment that prohibited same-sex marriage
and "[a] legal status identical or substantially similar to that of marriage for unmarried
individuals" against single-subject challenge based in part on its broad title and a
statement of purpose that incorporated each of the amendment's substantive provisions);
see also Daniel H. Lowenstein, California Initiatives and the Single-Subject Rule, 30
UCLA L. REv. 936, 965 (1983) (claiming that under a stringent test for enforcing
single-subject rules, "[d]rafters will manipulate the provisions of a measure to meet (or
appear to meet) whatever standard the court erects, sacrificing nothing or as little as
possible of the substance of what they or their clients hope to accomplish").
109. The judiciary's reluctance to resolve difficult interpretive issues in a
vacuum may, however, limit the ability of single-subject rules to perform this function.
See infra notes 118-21 and accompanying text; Forum for Equal. PAC, 893 So. 2d at
736-37 & n.31 (failing to address whether the challenged constitutional amendment
invalidated domestic partnership benefits, while endorsing the state's concession that
unmarried citizens could continue to enter enforceable contracts in Louisiana).
110. See infra Part III.B; Daniel H. Lowenstein, Initiatives and the New Single
Subject Rule, 1 ELECTION L.J. 35, 43 (2002) (acknowledging that a "willingness to
interpret ambiguous provisions of an initiative in order to avoid a single subject
violation ... seems a desirable and, indeed, an inevitable approach" to the
enforcement of those rules).
111. See infra Part IV (acknowledging the difficulty of assessing the
electorate's preferences on subsidiary issues, but suggesting that a burden should be
imposed upon initiative proponents to clearly articulate the particular legal
consequences in the text of their measures).
112. See Campbell, supra note 106, at 132 ("The general conclusion that can
be drawn from this review of the different requirements and the different applications
of similar requirements in the initiative states, is that single subject restrictions have
resulted in the judicial branch assuming a key, sometimes determinative, role in the
initiative process."); Lowenstein, supra note 108, at 938-42 (claiming that the
parameters of a "subject" are in the eyes of the beholder); Lowenstein, supra note 110,
at 44-48 (arguing that courts take on the illegitimate role of a "Council of Revision"
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postelection enforcement of single-subject rules is inherently
problematic and certainly not the most attractive option for avoiding the
bait-and-switch in direct democracy.
The official provision of accurate ballot titles and summaries is a
more promising way to notify voters of the contents of proposed ballot
measures prior to initiative elections. The effectiveness of the existing
procedures is frequently limited, however, to issues upon which an
initiative's text is already clear. Most states, including Michigan,
require the authors of ballot titles and summaries to provide "a true and
impartial statement of the purpose of the amendment or question in
such language as shall create no prejudice for or against such
proposal."1 13 Such directives encourage the authors of ballot titles and
summaries to draft their language in general terms. 1"4 They also
discourage or prohibit governmental officials from resolving
ambiguities about the legal consequences of proposed ballot measures at
an early stage of the process.15 While there may be good reasons for
this limitation, it necessarily prevents ballot titles and summaries from
clarifying the particular legal consequences of ambiguous ballot
measures for the voters. Ballot pamphlets will sometimes contain
allegations regarding such matters, but they are almost certain to
generate more questions than answers about the specific legal
when they strictly enforce single-subject rules, partly because this approach
.necessarily entails a subjective, standardless veto on the part of judges").
113. MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 168.474 (West 2005); see also CAL. ELECT.
CODE § 9051 (West 2003 & Supp. 2005) ("[T]he Attorney General shall give a true and
impartial statement of the purpose of the measure in such language that the ballot title
shall neither be an argument, nor be likely to create prejudice, for or against the
proposed measure.").
114. See, e.g., Parrish v. Lamm, 758 P.2d 1356, 1363 (Colo. 1988)
(explaining that "[an appropriate general title which is broad enough to include all the
subordinate matters considered is safer and wiser than an enumeration of several
subordinate matters in the title").
115. See, e.g., Advisory Opinion to the Attorney Gen. re: Fla. Marriage Prot.
Amendment, Nos. SC05-1563 & SC05-1831, at 9-19 (Fla. Mar. 23, 2006) (upholding
the ballot title and summary of a defense of marriage initiative because the "plain
meaning" of the phrase "marriage or the substantial equivalent thereof" disclosed the
amendment's chief purpose, and following precedent indicating that the "issue as to the
precise meaning of [such a] term [is] better left to subsequent litigation, should the
amendment pass" (quoting Advisory Opinion to the Attorney Gen. re: the Med. Liab.
Claimant's Comp. Amendment, 880 So. 2d 675 (Fla. 2004)); see also supra note 37
and accompanying text; Collins & Oesterle, supra note 102, at 96 (pointing out that the
Supreme Court of Colorado is careful not to "'interpret the meaning of proposed
language or suggest how it will be applied if adopted by the electorate'" (quoting
Dibble v. Bruce (In re Proposed Election Reform Amendment), 852 P.2d 28, 31-32
(Colo. 1993))).
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consequences of proposed ballot measures. 116 Accordingly, the
foregoing procedures for informing voters about the contents of
proposed ballot measures are generally insufficient to prevent collateral
consequences or eliminate the bait-and-switch in direct democracy-
which was vividly illustrated by the proceedings before the Board of
State Canvassers and subsequent litigation in Michigan. 117
The enforcement of single-subject rules prior to initiative elections
is subject to similar limitations in most jurisdictions that are willing to
entertain such challenges. Thus, when the text of a proposed ballot
measure is clear, some jurisdictions are willing to apply their single-
subject rules to preclude the certification of measures with multifarious
purposes for the ballot. "8 This approach has the potential benefits of
simplifying the measures presented to the voters and allowing them to
cast separate ballots on independent questions that are likely to generate
divergent opinions.119 Although the definition of a "single subject" will
never be transparent, the benefits of this approach arguably outweigh
the costs of requiring initiative proponents to narrow the scope of their
proposed ballot measures; particularly, if they are not required to
forego all of the costs of their successful initiative petitions. 120 On the
other hand, single-subject challenges cannot be fully resolved until
governmental officials have authoritatively ascertained the meaning and
scope of ambiguous provisions of ballot measures. Because the
officials in most jurisdictions appear understandably reluctant to
116. See Schacter, supra note 73, at 141-44 (describing shortcomings of the
information provided in ballot pamphlets and pointing out that the summaries and
arguments that "form the centerpiece of the ballot pamphlet ... can mislead-and are
sometimes designed to mislead-voters about the effects and potential consequences of
the vote").
117. See supra notes 29-38 and accompanying text.
118. See, e.g., Korte v. Bayless, 16 P.3d 200, 201-02 & n.2 (Ariz. 2001);
Outcelt v. Buckley (In re Title for 1999-2000 No. 44), 977 P.2d 856, 857 (Colo.
1999); see also Senate v. Jones, 988 P.2d 1089, 1096 (Cal. 1999) (distinguishing prior
cases and holding that "when a court determines that the challengers to an initiative
measure have demonstrated that there is a strong likelihood that the initiative violates
the single-subject rule, it is appropriate to resolve the single-subject challenge prior to
the election"); Campbell, supra note 106, at 144 ("Pre-election review of initiatives for
single subject compliance by the courts is becoming the rule, rather than exception.").
119. See Campbell, supra note 106, at 133 (explaining that "single subject rules
seek to prevent what is today commonly referred to as 'logrolling' and to make it easier
for both legislators and voters to inform themselves about policy changes being
proposed").
120. See Collins & Oesterle, supra note 102, at 111, 124-26 (endorsing the
enforcement of single-subject rules in the early stages of the lawmaking process as "a
useful limit on the scope of initiatives" and making recommendations that would limit
the expenses incurred by initiative proponents).
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perform this function before an election, 2' initiative proponents have
even further incentives to draft their measures in a broad and
ambiguous fashion. In any event, the preelection resolution of single-
subject challenges will not ordinarily clarify the particular legal
meaning of ambiguous ballot measures.
A restrained approach to using ballot titles and summaries or
single-subject rules to resolve legal ambiguity prior to an election is not
always followed.'22  Nonetheless, the aggressive use of these
procedures to clarify the specific legal consequences of proposed ballot
measures presents other formidable difficulties. First, this approach
raises nonjusticiability concerns by injecting governmental officials into
substantive disputes about the meaning of proposed ballot measures
before an election and forcing them to resolve legal issues in the
absence of a concrete case or controversy.123 Second, the aggressive
use of existing procedures to resolve legal ambiguity prior to an
election potentially encourages partisan manipulation by the
governmental officials who are typically responsible for their
"impartial" and "non-prejudicial" implementation. 124 Finally, this
121. See, e.g., Aisenberg v. Campbell (In re Title for 1997-1998 No. 64), 960
P.2d 1192, 1197 (Colo. 1998) ("In determining whether a proposed initiative comports
with the single subject requirement, '[w]e do not address the merits of a proposed
initiative, nor do we interpret its language or predict its application if adopted by the
electorate."' (quoting Sutherland v. Campbell (In re Proposed Petitions), 907 P.2d 586,
590 (Colo. 1995))); see also Advisory Opinion to the Attorney Gen. re: Fla. Marriage
Prot. Amendment, Nos. SC05-1563 & SC05-1831, at 3-9 (Fla. Mar. 23, 2006)
(rejecting a single-subject challenge to a broadly phrased defense of marriage initiative
without addressing its specific legal consequences because the proposal's language
reflected a single dominant plan or scheme to restrict "the exclusive rights and
obligations of marriage to legal unions consisting of one man and one woman as
husband and wife").
122. For example, the Florida Supreme Court has occasionally considered the
particular legal consequences of proposed ballot measures when it enforces these
procedural safeguards. See, e.g., In re Advisory Opinion to the Attorney Gen., 632
So. 2d 1018, 1020 (Fla. 1994). Regardless of a jurisdiction's stated approach, there is
likely variation in the extent to which courts and other governmental officials resolve
interpretive issues when they implement these procedural safeguards because statutory
ambiguity is necessarily a matter of degree. Cf Advisory Opinion to the Attorney
Gen. re: Fla. Marriage Prot. Amendment, Nos. SC05-1563 & SC05-1831, at 3-7, 9-19
(Fla. Mar. 23, 2006) (declining to resolve the specific legal consequences of a proposed
defense of marriage initiative and distinguishing other cases in which proposed ballot
measures were invalidated).
123. See, e.g., Lowenstein, supra note 110, at 43 (noting that one disadvantage
of the aggressive application of single-subject rules is the need to resolve difficult
interpretive problems in the abstract "when those most likely to favor a limited reach
for the initiative are forced to argue for a broad interpretation, in hopes of a favorable
single-subject decision").
124. For example, petitions were recently circulated to qualify an initiative in
California that would prohibit same-sex marriage and forbid governmental agencies
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practice arguably undermines the autonomy of initiative proponents in a
manner that conflicts with the underlying premises of direct democracy.
As a result, these procedures are not ideally designed for resolving
textual ambiguity prior to an election and thereby discouraging the bait-
and-switch in direct democracy.
The shortcomings of these procedural safeguards provide some
important clues about what is needed to avoid the bait-and-switch in
direct democracy and limit the collateral consequences of successful
ballot measures. First, an ideal solution would provide incentives for
the initiative proponents to resolve textual ambiguity and genuinely
clarify the particular legal consequences of proposed ballot measures
prior to an election. Second, it would avoid embroiling governmental
officials in remaining disputes about the meaning or validity of
ambiguous ballot measures until after they have been approved by the
electorate and there is a concrete case or controversy. In contrast to
existing procedures, the proposed solutions that follow would have each
of these desirable characteristics.
B. Substantive Canons of Interpretation
The most basic way to avoid the bait-and-switch in direct
democracy would be for the judiciary to interpret successful ballot
measures in a manner that binds the initiative proponents to their
positions during the election campaign. Thus, for example, when
Michigan courts address whether Proposal 2 precludes public
employers from offering domestic partnership benefits, they could rely
upon the fact that the initiative proponents denied that the amendment
would have such an effect to reach a negative conclusion. In essence,
from granting the rights of marriage to any unmarried persons. Petition Drive Begins
on Same-Sex Marriage Ban, KTVU.coM, July 25, 2005, http://ktvu.com/news/
4767839/detail.html. The attorney general issued a summary of this proposal that drew
attention to the measure's elimination of a wide range of domestic partnership benefits.
In addition, he changed the title of the proposal from "The Voters' Right to Protect
Marriage Act" to "Marriage. Elimination of Domestic Partnership Rights." Id. The
proponents of the measure responded by issuing a press release that announced their
intention to challenge this summary and alleged that "'[t]rue to his liberal bias, but
untrue to his constitutional duty, Bill Lockyer has dumped on us an inaccurate and
prejudicial paragraph that is anything but impartial and fair as the law requires.'" Press
Release, VoteYesMarriage.com, Lockyer Goes Against Marriage Again: Issues
Inaccurate and Prejudicial Title and Summary for California Marriage Amendment
(July 25, 2005) (quoting Randy Thomasson, an organizer of VoteYesMarriage.com),
available at http://voteyesmarriage.com/uploads/Release072505.pdf. Regardless of its
merits, this controversy illustrates one of the dangers posed by using ballot titles and
summaries or single-subject rules to resolve legal ambiguity prior to a ballot election.
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the judiciary could adopt a substantive canon of interpretation,'25 which
would narrowly construe ambiguous ballot measures in accordance with
the campaign statements of their proponents.
This new canon of statutory interpretation would admittedly raise a
few difficult and far-reaching questions. First, it would be necessary to
identify the initiative proponents and determine which of their
statements should count. Most jurisdictions already provide for the
designation of one or more initiative proponents.126 Although the
campaign advertising and other "official" public statements by those
individuals would be a fine place to start, the import of the proposed
doctrine could easily be avoided if the judiciary refused to look any
further. Jurisdictions that authorize the direct initiative would therefore
ideally require the formal designation of a broader group of initiative
proponents, which should include a ballot measure's official sponsors,
consultants, and major financial contributors.' 27 This registry could
subsequently be utilized by courts to ascertain who was speaking on a
measure's behalf. Otherwise, courts could make similar determinations
by using existing campaign finance disclosure requirements or evidence
submitted by the parties.'28 Because many public statements by these
initiative proponents would be easily verifiable, their use by courts for
interpretive guidance would seem unobjectionable. On the other hand,
courts should be reluctant to utilize potentially unreliable hearsay, such
as the private conversations of initiative proponents, when they
interpret legal meaning.'29 Press reports of the stated positions of
125. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION 329-74 (2000) (describing substantive canons of statutory
interpretation and explaining that they "attempt to harmonize statutory meaning with
policies rooted in the common law, other statutes, or the Constitution").
126. See, e.g., CAL. ELEC. CODE § 9002 (West 2004) (providing that "[tlhe
persons presenting the request [for a title and summary of purpose from the attorney
general] shall be known as the 'proponents.'"); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1-40-104
(West 1999) (requiring the designation of "two persons who shall represent the
proponents in all matters affecting the petition").
127. Major financial contributors should include those who contribute
substantial funds to the official sponsors of the ballot measure, as well as those who
make campaign expenditures in coordination with the initiative proponents. See
Staszewski, supra note 3, at 420-21 n. 106 (defining "initiative proponents").
128. See Kang, supra note 94, at 1165-69 (explaining that "[c]ampaign finance
disclosure is the principal regulatory mechanism currently directed toward informing
the public about who supports and opposes various candidates and ballot measures" and
claiming that "plentiful information is available to those interested enough to seek it").
129. This is not to say that misrepresentations will not occur in an informal
setting. See, e.g., Mich. Civil Rights Initiative v. Bd. of State Canvassers, 708
N.W.2d 139 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005) (directing the Board of State Canvassers to certify
an initiative that would prohibit affirmative action for the election ballot and holding
that the Board lacked statutory authority to investigate whether fraudulent
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initiative proponents, which are made available to the general public but
might reasonably be subject to dispute, would likely present the greatest
challenges in this regard, and their probative value would necessarily
depend upon the circumstances presented in a particular case.
In addition to these practical concerns, the adoption of a special
substantive canon of interpretation for successful ballot measures
implicates more fundamental questions about the appropriate
interpretive methodology in this context. Leading legislation scholars
have recognized that the characteristic problems of the dominant
approaches to statutory interpretation are magnified in the ballot
initiative context. 3' For example, the familiar difficulty of attributing a
coherent intent to a multimember body is magnified when the electorate
consists of millions of voters-particularly when they cannot reasonably
be expected to comprehend some of the specific details of what they are
voting upon."' Professor Jane Schacter has demonstrated that while
courts typically claim to ascertain the intent of the voters when they
interpret successful ballot measures, the judiciary routinely ignores the
advertising and media accounts that most heavily influence voting
decisions and relies instead upon formal sources of legal meaning that
are systematically inaccessible to the electorate. 132  As the previous
discussion begins to suggest, any genuine effort to ascertain the
"popular intent" by making extensive use of advertising and media
reports would be fraught with difficulty.' 33 Because the formal sources
of legal meaning used by courts are accessible to-and largely
constructed by-the initiative proponents who draft ballot measures,
courts are in reality privileging the intentions of the proponents of
representations were made by circulators in order to obtain signatures on behalf of the
measure).
130. See, e.g., Frickey, supra note 73; Schacter, supra note 73; see also
Staszewski, supra note 3, at 406-11 (describing the problems associated with the
interpretation of successful ballot measures). But cf Michael M. O'Hear, Statutory
Interpretation and Direct Democracy: Lessons From the Drug Treatment Initiatives, 40
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 281 (2003) (critiquing Frickey's and Schacter's proposals based on
case studies involving the interpretation of ballot measures that require treatment rather
than incarceration for certain nonviolent drug offenders).
131. See Schacter, supra note 73, at 123-28.
132. See id. at 130-44. These formal sources of legal meaning include the
language of the ballot measure, the language of related statutes, canons of statutory
construction, legal precedent, and information from ballot pamphlets, which is
sometimes used in lieu of legislative history. See id. at 119-23.
133. See supra notes 126-29 and accompanying text; see also Schacter, supra
note 73, at 130, 144-47 (concluding that a judicial inquiry into the media accounts and
advertising that actually influenced the voters is unlikely to yield any unbiased or
determinate answers to the interpretive questions facing courts).
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ballot measures in the name of voter intent when they rely upon formal
sources of legal meaning to interpret direct democratic measures."'
The overwhelming influence of initiative proponents would only be
exacerbated if the judiciary discarded "intentionalism" in favor of other
interpretive methodologies in this context. Thus, in addition to its other
characteristic problems, strict textualism and its reliance on the "plain
meaning" of an enactment would seem particularly unjustifiable when it
is well established that most voters do not read or fully comprehend the
language of initiative measures-which are often ambiguously drafted
in the first place. 35 To the extent that textualism is justified by the
federal constitutional structure and its requirements of bicameralism
and presentment,'3 6 there would be no reason to extend its application
to a lawmaking process where those structural safeguards are carefully
omitted. The same consideration would undermine heavy reliance on
"purposivism" in this context because this approach to statutory
interpretation is based largely upon benign presumptions of coherent
action by elected representatives in an ongoing deliberative process,
which cannot plausibly be extended to the one-shot process of direct
decision making on a single issue by the electorate.'37 In addition,
routinely construing ambiguity in a generous fashion to promote an
initiative's broad underlying purpose would further privilege the
intentions of the initiative proponents, increase the collateral
consequences of successful ballot measures, and potentially facilitate
the bait-and-switch in direct democracy.' 3
134. See Schacter, supra note 73, at 128-30; Staszewski, supra note 3, at 432-
33; see also supra note 87 and accompanying text.
135. See Schacter, supra note 73, at 149-50 (explaining that the "animating, yet
often untenable, idea that there is a single ordinary or plain meaning" is especially
problematic in the ballot initiative context). For a summary of the major critiques of
textualism, see ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 125, at 230-36. For discussions of the
poorly drafted nature of many initiative measures, see supra note 90 and accompanying
text; Eule, supra note 3, at 1516 ("Considering the complexity and obtuseness of some
measures, it's a wonder that anyone knows what he or she is voting on."); Frickey,
supra note 73, at 481 ("For a variety of reasons, direct democracy is probably more
likely than legislative lawmaking to produce ambiguous statutory text.").
136. See John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101
COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2001).
137. See Garrett, supra note 87, at 32-33; Frickey, supra note 73, at 486-87,
506. For a comprehensive discussion of the constitutional underpinnings of the
"absurdity doctrine" and other strongly purposive approaches -to statutory
interpretation, see generally Glen Staszewski, Avoiding Absurdity, 81 IND. L.J.
(forthcoming 2006).
138. See Schacter, supra note 73, at 159 (recognizing that "a broad-purpose
approach" could encourage "abuse of the initiative process" and that an appropriate
rule of narrow construction "would reduce the incentives for initiative proponents to
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Because the leading approaches to statutory interpretation do not
translate well to the initiative process, it seems necessary and
appropriate for courts to adopt substantive canons that are specifically
designed for interpreting ballot measures. These canons should, in
turn, seek to ameliorate the structural shortcomings of the ballot
initiative process by resolving statutory ambiguity in ways that promote
normatively attractive principles of democracy.'39 Professor Schacter
has therefore advocated the narrow interpretation of ambiguous
language when it seems especially likely that a ballot measure was
tainted by the manipulation of "highly organized, concentrated, and
well-funded interests.' Similarly, Professor Philip Frickey has
recommended the establishment of a strong preference for continuity in
the ballot initiative context based on republican principles of
government, whereby "pre-existing law is displaced by the ballot
proposition only when the clear text or evident, core purposes of the
electorate so require." 4' The adoption of a substantive canon that
narrowly construes ambiguity in accordance with the campaign
statements of initiative proponents would further improve the
democratic legitimacy of the ballot initiative process in one particularly
draft long, intricate, and ambiguous laws, the complexity of which can effectively be
shrouded by slogans and soundbites").
139. See id. at 153; see also Jane S. Schacter, Metademocracy: The Changing
Structure of Legitimacy in Statutory Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REv. 593, 595 (1995)
(claiming that in addition to assigning legal meaning in a particular case, statutory
interpretation also produces "'democratizing' effects-that is, institutional or social
effects that correspond to a particular image of democracy"); Staszewski, supra note
137 (justifying the judiciary's practice of interpreting statutes contrary to their plain
meaning to avoid absurd results based on a particular political and constitutional
theory).
140. See Schacter, supra note 73, at 156-61. Professor Schacter also suggested
that courts should encourage deliberation regarding the implementation of direct
democratic measures by making the process of litigating the meaning of ambiguous
ballot measures open to a broader range of perspectives. See id. at 155-56.
141. Frickey, supra note 73, at 522; see also id. at 517 ("[A] preference for
republican lawmaking should suggest that statutes in derogation of republican
processes-both because they were adopted as ballot propositions and because they
might displace existing laws adopted through representative channels-should not be
broadly construed."). Frickey's proposals were designed to promote judicially
underenforced constitutional norms, including republican principles of government, in
the ballot initiative context. He therefore also suggested that the practice of interpreting
ambiguous statutory provisions to avoid constitutional difficulties should lead courts to
interpret ballot measures narrowly on "subsidiary issues" that raise constitutional
concerns when a broad interpretation is not mandated by the initiative's text or core
purposes. See id. at 512-16. Finally, he claimed that "to the extent a ballot
proposition runs up against specialized canons, such as the rule of lenity, those canons
should have somewhat more force than they would in the context of legislatively
adopted law." Id. at 522-23.
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troubling set of circumstances. Indeed, the use of these canons, in
tandem, would alleviate the problem of faction, promote deliberation
about the details of legislation, and discourage initiative proponents
from seeking to mislead the electorate about the intended consequences
of their proposals.
Not coincidentally, these interpretive techniques would also
provide effective avenues for avoiding the bait-and-switch in direct
democracy and minimizing the collateral consequences of successful
ballot measures. The story of Proposal 2, in fact, provides a textbook
example of the applicability of each of the foregoing substantive canons
of interpretation. First, the warning signs of potential manipulation by
initiative proponents were readily apparent in this situation. Even in
the absence of a "bait-and-switch," the broad language of Proposal 2
was tailor-made to create confusion among the electorate regarding its
specific legal consequences, while simultaneously providing initiative
proponents or their allies with plausible grounds to lobby public
officials for an expansive interpretation of the measure based on formal
legal sources of meaning. Proposal 2 explicitly targeted a socially
marginalized group, which further increased the potential for
exploitation by inflaming popular passions about same-sex marriage and
thereby distracting the electorate's attention from the proposal's other
possible consequences. 14 2 Because these factors militate "in favor of a
narrow construction of the law, one that declines to permit ambiguous
language to work major changes in the law when there are strong
reasons to doubt that voters considered and approved specific
changes,"' 43 the conclusion that Proposal 2 does not affect domestic
partnership benefits would be inescapable under this analysis.
The same conclusion would certainly follow, albeit for somewhat
different reasons, if courts adopted "a general working presumption in
favor of narrow construction when directly adopted laws are in tension
with pre-existing law."'" This presumption would preclude an
interpretation of Proposal 2 that prohibits public employers from
granting domestic partnership benefits because neither its clear text nor
the evident, core purposes of the electorate would compel this outcome.
Despite the attorney general's advisory opinion to the contrary, it seems
fair to say that the language of Proposal 2 does not clearly prohibit
domestic partnership benefits. If the text itself were not conclusive,
one should be persuaded by the nature of the debate on this issue during
the ballot campaign, as well as by the apparent consensus on the
eventual need for a judicial resolution of the controversy and the trial
142. See Schacter, supra note 73, at 157-58.
143. Id. at 158.
144. Frickey, supra note 73, at 522.
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court's competing decision. These considerations, together, nicely
demonstrate that Proposal 2 has no "plain meaning." Moreover, the
evident, core purpose of the electorate was to prohibit same-sex
marriage and its functional equivalent, not necessarily to invalidate
domestic partnership benefits. Because this "core purpose" will
undoubtedly be achieved by any plausible construction of the
constitutional amendment, Proposal 2 does not need to be broadly
construed to eliminate domestic partnership benefits in order "to give
the electorate their due. "1 4
5
A strong preference for continuity in the ballot initiative context
would put the initiative proponents on notice that if they want a
proposal to have broad legal effects on subsidiary issues, they will be
expected to draft their measures so that those legal consequences are
readily apparent.'" Not only would this obligation limit strategic
drafting and misleading behavior by the initiative proponents, but it
would also provide an opportunity for more meaningful deliberation
about the specific ramifications of a ballot measure that could be
considered by the electorate. "' For example, even though it was
readily apparent from the election campaign that Proposal 2 could
potentially eliminate domestic partnership benefits, the textual
ambiguity focused the debate almost exclusively on whether the
proposal would have such an effect. Because of the way this debate
played out, none of the initiative proponents (or anyone else, for that
matter) ever provided a reasoned explanation for why domestic
partnership benefits should be eliminated. Meanwhile, the initiative
opponents never fully articulated their argument for why public
employers should be allowed to continue to provide such benefits.141 If
the elimination of domestic partnership benefits had been clearly
presented to the voters, a debate would almost certainly have occurred
on the merits of this proposal. Regardless of the quality of the resulting
deliberations, initiative proponents should be compelled to provide
accurate explanations of their proposed legal reforms, rather than being
allowed to engage in lawmaking by obfuscation.
The clarity of the text is particularly important in the ballot
initiative context because initiative proponents are precluded from fine-
145. See id. at 521 ("In the final analysis, judicial consideration of ballot
propositions should have two distinct goals: to give the electorate their due and to
protect public values. ").
146. See id. at 522-23.
147. See id. at 523.
148. The most extensive arguments in favor of the continued legality of
domestic partnership benefits were apparently articulated by the opponents of Proposal
2 after the election. See Kaplan & Moss, supra note 7; Compl. for Declaratory Relief,
Nat'l Pride at Work, Inc. v. Granholm, No. 265870 (Mar. 21, 2005).
HeinOnline -- 2006 Wis. L. Rev. 51 2006
WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
tuning their proposals in response to concerns that arise during the
lawmaking process or "codifying" their stated positions on interpretive
questions.' 49 This limitation, in particular, allows initiative proponents
to curtail debate on subsidiary legal issues and potentially to perform a
"bait-and-switch." Thus, for example, when the initiative proponents
denied that Proposal 2 would have any effect on existing domestic
partnership benefits, there was little reason for extended deliberation on
the merits of this course of action. Despite the absence of a meaningful
debate, the attorney general has interpreted the amendment broadly to
prohibit domestic partnership benefits, thereby completing the bait-and-
switch in direct democracy."' A substantive canon that narrowly
interprets ambiguous ballot measures in accordance with the campaign
statements of their proponents would foreclose precisely this sequence
of events by holding that Proposal 2 does not affect domestic
partnership benefits. This canon would therefore undermine the ability
of initiative proponents to mislead voters about the intended
consequences of their proposals, and create potential incentives for
them to be more candid during ballot campaigns.
The foregoing interpretive techniques would also provide a
sensible way to achieve some of the legitimate goals of single-subject
rules.' Because the proposed canons apply only to the interpretation
of ambiguous text on subsidiary issues that were not necessarily
resolved by the voters, they will by definition result in the narrow
construction of ballot measures that might otherwise appear problematic
under single-subject rules. The proposed interpretive techniques would
therefore have the potential virtue of allowing courts to avoid the
resolution of many single-subject challenges, which are of a
constitutional dimension in many jurisdictions.'52 Thus, when the
canons are invoked, they would also preclude initiative proponents
from achieving a disfavored form of logrolling, whereby the electorate
approves a proposal with unsupported consequences based on the
majority's approval of the central purpose of the measure.'53 Because
149. See supra notes 99-101 and accompanying text.
150. See Same-Sex Domestic Partnership Benefits, supra note 10, at 17.
151. See supra Part III.A.
152. See, e.g., MICH. CONST. art. IV, § 24 ("No law shall embrace more than
one object, which shall be expressed in its title."). The canons are therefore also
supported by the widely accepted proposition that when fairly possible, courts should
interpret statutes to avoid constitutional difficulties. See Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley
Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 348 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (quoting Crowell v.
Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932)).
153. Kurt Kastorf has recently pointed out that logrolling can either broaden
support for a measure by increasing the size of its supporting coalition or weaken
support for a measure by "piling on" outcomes favored only by its most extreme
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the clear provisions of an initiative will generally be implemented
regardless of its potential multiplicity of purposes, these interpretive
techniques may not completely prevent logrolling. In those situations,
however, the canons will have helped to avoid voter confusion because
the full range of the ballot measure's consequences would be
discernible from the plain meaning of its text. The single-subject
challenges that still occur would therefore ultimately require less
speculation about the precise meaning of the ballot measure at issue.
This could, in turn, render the enforcement of existing single-subject
rules more effective.
Although the foregoing interpretive techniques would alleviate the
structural shortcomings of the ballot initiative process and respect the
apparent policy preferences of voters, they would not definitively
resolve every case or provide the true structural reform that may be
necessary."' The limitations of these interpretive techniques become
proponents. See Kurt G. Kastorf, Logrolling Gets Logrolled: Same Sex Marriage,
Direct Democracy, and the Single Subject Rule, 54 EMORY L.J. 1633, 1646-55 (2005).
He argues that because logrolling in the legislature is more likely to have the former
attributes, while logrolling in the ballot initiative process is more likely to have the
latter attributes, courts should enforce single-subject rules more aggressively in the
ballot initiative context. See id.
154. Perhaps the greatest difficulty that would be presented by the adoption of
the proposed interpretive techniques would be to ascertain the "core purpose" of a
successful ballot measure. Cf Note, Legislative Purpose, Rationality and Equal
Protection, 82 YALE L.J. 123 (1972) (providing a classic criticism of the purpose
inquiry mandated by the rational basis test). Unlike single-subject rules, which raise a
similar problem, these canons of interpretation do not foreclose the initiative proponents
from achieving any outcome as long as the text of a measure is clear. Moreover, while
the application of the canons would require some judgment, courts have utilized the
concept of a "legislative purpose" with reasonable success in a variety of contexts. See
Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL.
L. REv. 845, 865 (1992) ("In practice, we ascribe purposes to group activities all the
time without many practical difficulties."). Thus, most courts would certainly agree
that a "Defense of Marriage" initiative does not invalidate the application of a domestic
violence statute to an unmarried defendant who cohabited with the victim. See supra
note 13 (citing conflicting judicial decisions in Ohio on this issue). Conversely, the
canons would not preclude a court from holding that the provisions of an initiative that
mandated rehabilitation rather than incarceration for certain drug possession convictions
extended to the convictions of otherwise similarly situated offenders for possession of
drug paraphernalia. See State v. Estrada, 34 P.3d 356 (Ariz. 2001). But cf O'Hear,
supra note 130, at 283-84 (claiming that the drug treatment cases highlight important
difficulties with Schacter's and Frickey's proposals). First, this is not the type of
initiative that likely provides "fertile terrain" for manipulation by powerful special
interests who are well situated "to strategically propound, package, and draft initiatives
in ways that enable them ... to create a phantom popular intent and thus to appropriate
the political authority of the largely passive electorate." Schacter, supra note 73, at
156-57. On the contrary, drug paraphernalia convictions obviously created a
"loophole" that was almost certainly unanticipated by its sponsors. Second, a strong
presumption of continuity in the ballot initiative context could easily be overcome in
HeinOnline -- 2006 Wis. L. Rev. 53 2006
54 WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
apparent if one considers the potential judicial response to a couple of
variations on Proposal 2's story. In the first scenario, the initiative
proponents expressly claim in their campaign advertisements that their
proposal will not have any effect on domestic parmership benefits, but
the text of the measure provides that "state actors shall not provide any
benefits for the unmarried domestic partners of governmental
employees." In the second scenario, Proposal 2's actual text is
presented to the voters, but the initiative proponents expressly proclaim
during the ballot campaign that the measure will prohibit public
employers from providing domestic partnership benefits. Conventional
wisdom suggests that the judiciary should defer to the clear text in the
former scenario, while a strong preference for continuity in this context
and the dangers of potential manipulation by initiative proponents
would point toward a narrow interpretation of the ballot measure in the
latter situation. 155  This resolution of the first case is very troubling,
however, because it ignores blatant misrepresentation by the initiative
proponents. Although the proposed outcome of the second case is
defensible on the grounds that initiative proponents should be
encouraged to be clear about particular legal consequences in the text of
their measures, the inability to amend a proposal's language in response
to concerns that arise during the lawmaking process could make this
result appear somewhat harsh or contrary to the goals of implementing
voter preferences and promoting reasoned deliberation.
These hypothetical variations on the story of Proposal 2 illustrate
that a complete resolution of the structural shortcomings of the ballot
initiative process may demand a more comprehensive, structural
Estrada based on the judiciary's continued obligation to implement the core purpose of
a successful ballot measure. See Frickey, supra note 73, at 521-22 (asserting that
giving the electorate their due should be one of the goals of judicial consideration of
ballot propositions). As the court explained, a refusal to provide the benefits of this
initiative to otherwise eligible offenders who were convicted of possession of drug
paraphernalia could effectively negate the utility of the entire ballot measure because
most defendants who are charged with drug possession could also be charged with
possession of drug paraphernalia. See Estrada, 34 P.3d at 361. Finally, it is virtually
inconceivable that the proponents of the drug treatment initiative issued any public
statements denying that their measure would have an effect on the sentencing of
possession of drug paraphernalia. Accordingly, a canon that narrowly construed
ambiguous ballot measures consistent with the public statements of initiative proponents
would almost certainly be inapplicable.
155. See Staszewski, supra note 3, at 458-59 & n.232 (claiming that courts
should be skeptical of the statements made by initiative proponents about the meaning
of a measure outside of an official lawmaking record). In combination, the proposed
canons would narrowly construe ambiguity consistent with the campaign statements of
the initiative proponents, while also requiring them to clearly articulate the intended
legal consequences in the text of their measures. This combination would significantly
limit the opportunities for strategic manipulation by the initiative proponents.
HeinOnline -- 2006 Wis. L. Rev. 54 2006
2006:17 The Bait-and-Switch in Direct Democracy 55
solution. While interpretive techniques can minimize these problems
and create better incentives, they are incapable of constructing a formal
lawmaking structure that is specifically designed to clarify the intended
consequences of ballot measures and promote reasoned deliberation.
Nor do they provide opportunities for initiative proponents to modify
the language of their proposals in response to legitimate concerns that
arise during the lawmaking process. The following section identifies
formal structural safeguards that would promote these objectives, in
addition to avoiding the bait-and-switch in direct democracy and
minimizing the collateral consequences of successful ballot measures.
C. Improved Structural Safeguards
The ballot initiative process is not the only form of lawmaking that
is controlled by unelected citizens who operate without the constraints
of bicameralism and presentment.156  On the contrary, legislative
rulemaking by administrative agencies has proliferated since the New
Deal, despite concerns about the constitutionality of this practice that
stem largely from these characteristics."' Unlike the ballot initiative
process, however, administrative law has developed alternative
structural safeguards to facilitate careful deliberation and reasoned
decision making in the rulemaking process.' 58  In particular,
administrative agencies must follow the notice-and-comment
rulemaking procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act, and their
decisions must withstand hard-look judicial review. 1 59 These safeguards
have substantially improved the legitimacy of administrative lawmaking
156. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
157. See Peter H. Aranson et al., A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68
CORNELL L. REV. 1, 7-17 (1982) (providing an historical overview of the development
of the nondelegation doctrine); see also Lisa Schultz Bressman, Schecter Poultry at the
Millennium: A Delegation Doctrine for the Administrative State, 109 YALE L.J. 1399
(2000); Kenneth Culp Davis, A New Approach to Delegation, 36 U. CHI. L. REv. 713
(1968-1969).
158. See Staszewski, supra note 3, at 445-46; see also Sidney A. Shapiro &
Richard E. Levy, Heightened Scrutiny of the Fourth Branch: Separation of Powers and
the Requirement of Adequate Reasons for Agency Decisions, 1987 DuKE L.J. 387, 388
(explaining that hard-look judicial review "is best understood as a form of heightened
scrutiny of the rationale of agency decisions and that the doctrine of separation of
powers requires such scrutiny because of the unique position of administrative agencies
in terms of the constitutional structure of government"); Cass R. Sunstein, Interest
Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 60-61 (1985) ("Much of
modem administrative law is a means of serving the original purposes of the
nondelegation doctrine, and of promoting Madisonian goals, without invalidating
regulatory statutes . . ").
159. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2000); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).
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by ensuring that it adequately reflects republican principles of
government. "6
I have previously argued that the same basic structural safeguards
that presently constrain administrative agencies should be adopted in the
ballot initiative context. 16' Thus, after qualifying a measure for the
ballot, the initiative proponents should be required to provide the
general public with notice of their proposal and an opportunity to
submit written comments and proposed amendments. '62 The initiative
proponents should be allowed to amend their proposal in response to
any legitimate concerns that arise, but they should also be required to
promulgate a general statement of the basis and purpose of their fimal
proposal that explains any major changes, in addition to their reasoning
for rejecting various objections and proposed amendments. 163 Finally,
courts should be authorized to engage in hard-look review of the
validity of successful ballot measures under an arbitrary and capricious
standard,"6 which would allow them to ascertain whether the initiative
proponents engaged in reasoned decision making during the lawmaking
process. '65
The adoption of this proposal by a state legislature or municipality
would routinely foreclose the bait-and-switch in direct democracy by
encouraging initiative proponents to take official positions on
foreseeable interpretive issues, and providing effective mechanisms for
holding them to their statements during the ballot campaign. The
former objective would be achieved by providing the public with an
opportunity to comment on initiative proposals, and requiring the
initiative proponents to respond to those comments in the materials
accompanying their final proposal. Thus, for example, if this
procedure had been followed prior to the enactment of Proposal 2, the
opponents of the measure would undoubtedly have submitted comments
160. See Staszewski, supra note 3, at 446-47; see also Mark Seidenfeld, A
Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1511,
1512 (1992) (arguing that "the political theory of civic republicanism, with its emphasis
on citizen participation in government and deliberative decision-making, provides the
best justification for the American bureaucracy"); Sunstein, supra note 158, at 57-59
(describing administrative law doctrine as "classically republican" because of its
requirements of "deliberation" and "reasoned analysis").
161. See Staszewski, supra note 3, at 447-59 (advocating the application of an
"agency model" to direct democracy).
162. Id. at 449.
163. Id. at 449-50.
164. Id. at 450.
165. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n, 463 U.S. at 43; ERNEST GELLHORN &
RONALD M. LEVIN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS IN A NUTSHELL 107-09 (4th ed.
1997) (summarizing the development of hard-look review and attributing the term
.reasoned decisionmaking" to Judge Leventhal of the D.C. Circuit).
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objecting to the proposal's potential effect on domestic partnership
benefits. The proponents would subsequently have been required to
respond to those comments "on the record" in their general statement
of basis and purpose. If the initiative proponents failed to satisfy this
obligation, the measure would be subject to judicial invalidation based
on their failure to consider the important aspects of the problem and
respond in a reasoned fashion. 166
This proposal would also provide effective mechanisms for binding
the initiative proponents to their stated positions during a ballot
campaign. In particular, the creation of a formal lawmaking record
would provide an authoritative resource for the judiciary in subsequent
interpretive disputes. 167 This development would benefit the initiative
proponents by greatly improving the prospects that their stated positions
on particular interpretive issues would be adopted by the judiciary and
other governmental officials responsible for implementing successful
ballot measures. 168 At the same time, however, this development would
almost certainly foreclose the initiative proponents or their allies from
persuading decision makers to adopt a contrary interpretation after the
election. Indeed, if the public statements of the initiative proponents
during the ballot campaign could not be squared with their official
positions in the lawmaking record, a successful ballot measure could be
invalidated based on their failure to engage in reasoned decision making
under the applicable standard of review. 169
The foregoing combination of carrots and sticks would allow this
proposal to overcome the limitations of using interpretive techniques to
avoid the bait-and-switch in direct democracy. First, the proposal
would authorize the initiative proponents to amend the text of a ballot
measure prior to the election to correct unanticipated problems, clarify
the measure's intended scope, and perhaps codify the positions
articulated in their general statement of basis and purpose. As a result,
textual ambiguity regarding the intended resolution of reasonably
foreseeable interpretive issues could be nearly eliminated. Under this
approach, the text of Proposal 2 could have been amended prior to the
election to clarify its intended effect on the legality of domestic
partnership benefits. Second, an effective remedy would be available if
the public statements of the initiative proponents during a campaign
flatly contradicted the plain meaning of the text of their measure.
166. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n, 463 U.S. at 43 (explaining that an agency
rule would be deemed arbitrary and capricious under the APA if the agency had
"entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem").
167. See Staszewski, supra note 3, at 455-56.
168. See id.
169. See id. at 458 & n.232.
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Thus, for example, if the text of Proposal 2 clearly prohibited public
employers from providing domestic partnership benefits and the
campaign advertising of the proponents was to the contrary, the
judiciary would have a basis for invalidating the measure under the
arbitrary and capricious standard of review.
Given the animating purposes of applying an "agency model" to
direct democracy, it is important to recognize that the adoption of this
proposal would also facilitate reasoned deliberation regarding the
substantive merits of a proposed ballot measure during the lawmaking
process. 70  The notice-and-comment proceeding would provide
interested parties with an opportunity to communicate with each other
about the best course of action for promoting the public good.'7 ' By
allowing the initiative proponents to amend their initial proposal in
response to concerns that arise, a new opportunity would be established
for compromise on areas of apparent disagreement and for otherwise
improving the substance of a proposed measure.'72 In any event, the
initiative proponents would be compelled to provide a reasoned
explanation for their actions in the general statement of the basis and
purpose for their final proposal, which could later be subject to judicial
review. "' Accordingly, the proponents of Proposal 2 would not only
have been required to take an official position on the legality of
domestic partnership benefits under this approach, but they would also
have been obligated to consider the competing perspectives of other
interested parties and to give a coherent explanation for their decision.
The official lawmaking record that would be generated by this
proposal would therefore improve the quality of the deliberations
during a ballot campaign.'74 For starters, this material could be made
available to the general public on the Internet or by incorporation into
the ballot pamphlets that are already distributed to the voters in some
jurisdictions. The public comments on a measure and the responses of
the initiative proponents would provide more useful information to the
voters than is currently available in most ballot elections. Even if
voters did not directly consider this material, an official lawmaking
record would provide valuable information to the media and other
elites, which could be conveyed to the voters through news stories,
endorsements, and editorials. Finally, by encouraging an initiative's
proponents and opponents to clearly articulate their positions on the
record at an early stage in the lawmaking process, a more meaningful
170. See id. at 451-52.
171. See id.
172. See id. at 452.
173. See id. at 449-50.
174. See id. at 451-52 & n.220, 490-91.
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debate of the merits of a proposed ballot measure could take place
during the subsequent campaign because the stakes of the election
would already be apparent.'75 If, for example, Proposal 2's proponents
had expressly declared that their constitutional amendment would
invalidate domestic partnership benefits, the merits of this particular
course of action would almost certainly have been the subject of
vigorous debate during the ballot campaign.
In sum, the application of an agency model to the ballot initiative
process would avoid the bait-and-switch in direct democracy and limit
the collateral consequences of successful ballot measures. By allowing
the initiative proponents to amend their proposals while holding them
accountable for their actions during a ballot campaign, this proposal
would also avoid the inherent limitations of relying solely upon
interpretive principles for. such purposes. Meanwhile, the democratic
legitimacy of this form of lawmaking would be bolstered by
establishing structural mechanisms to facilitate reasoned deliberation in
the ballot initiative process and the accurate expression of voter
preferences.
IV. BROADER IMPLICATIONS FOR POLITICS
An observer of candidate elections and the traditional legislative
process may question the particular concern with direct democracy and
a call for reform based on the events surrounding Proposal 2. After all,
everyone knows that candidates for public office are not always
forthcoming about the details of their political agendas and that elected
officials are routinely chastised for breaking "campaign promises."
Moreover, participants in the ordinary legislative process are not
necessarily precluded from seeking to mislead legislators about the
potential consequences of the large number of proposals about which
our elected representatives are personally uninformed.7 6  Finally,
voters in direct democracy may already have sufficient information in
high profile elections to cast votes that accurately reflect their
preferences. Because this could conceivably have been true of Proposal
2, it is possible that critics of the ballot initiative process may seize on
this story as a basis for reform that is only required by their own
competing normative perspective of democracy.
175. See id. at 452.
176. See Bernard W. Bell, Legislative History Without Legislative Intent. The
Public Justification Approach to Statutory Interpretation, 60 OHIo ST. L.J. 1, 55-56 &
nn.202-04 (1999) (pointing out that "most legislators give little thought to any
particular statute, and certainly do not formulate a position on the numerous specific
issues that will confront courts and agencies in applying the statute").
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While more candid and well-informed deliberation is desirable in
each of these contexts, there are times when the ballot initiative process
combines passionate voting (by the electorate) and instrumental
lawmaking (by initiative proponents or others) in a way that is
especially prone toward divergence (based on the absence of
representation and other structural safeguards). Therefore, the
structural dynamics of direct democracy create a special problem that
should be addressed regardless of the quality of the deliberations in
candidate elections and the legislature. Because this problem
undermines the ability of the ballot initiative process to accurately
reflect the "will of the people," the proposals to eliminate the bait-and-
switch in direct democracy should be fully embraced by the strongest
advocates of this form of lawmaking. Because the same proposals
would facilitate reasoned deliberation by the initiative proponents, they
would also improve the democratic legitimacy of this form of
lawmaking from the main competing normative perspective. My
proposal for structural reform, in particular, could therefore bridge the
divide between modem populists who continue to praise direct
democracy and this generation's progressives who tend to be critical of
the initiative process based on republican principles of government. 177
The primary distinction between the ballot initiative process and
candidate elections for present purposes is that while the former may
result in the enactment of a new statute or constitutional amendment,
the latter is simply not a form of lawmaking and is therefore not
directly instrumental. Moreover, once a candidate is elected to the
legislature, she cannot implement any of her own policy objectives
without the agreement of a large number of fellow representatives.178
Although this characteristic of the legislative process can make promise
177. See Miller, supra note 74, at 1039 (distinguishing between populist and
progressive conceptions of direct democracy and claiming that "[m]any modern-day
Progressives are disenchanted with the initiative process and seek through reforms to
constrain its Populist characteristics"); cf Clark, supra note 102, at 450 (observing that
.nice theoretical distinctions are unlikely to alter the debate over direct democracy
unless they can be couched in terms that resonate with those whose priority is not
fidelity to some particular interpretation of eighteenth-century liberal theory, but rather
giving the people of today a voice in governing themselves"). On the other hand,
strong advocates of direct democracy may prefer the use of interpretive techniques to
avoid the bait-and-switch in direct democracy based on the potentially severe
consequences and unpredictable nature of arbitrary and capricious review. See
Staszewski, supra note 3, at 482-91 (responding to these potential concerns and
emphasizing the importance of republican principles of government and the need to
legitimize the ballot initiative process).
178. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 ("Every Bill which shall have passed the
House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented
to the President of the United States.").
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keeping and its enforcement difficult by creating a potential tension
between constituent preferences and legislative outcomes, this is an
essential feature of representative democracy. 179 In any event, the need
to stand for reelection provides a potential mechanism for holding
representatives accountable for their prior statements and actions. The
point is not that political candidates always keep their word or that
choosing self-interested representatives would be unproblematic, 80 but
rather that the act of electing a representative is fundamentally different
from lawmaking and there are safeguards to prevent individual
lawmakers from acting contrary to a salient conception of the public
good.
It is largely those safeguards, moreover, that distinguish the
ordinary legislative process from the ballot initiative process for present
purposes by providing conditions that reduce the likelihood that
representatives will be deceived about the specific contents of a law and
give them opportunities to resolve their particular concerns. In theory,
of course, professional legislators would have the leisure to learn about
the problems of the day and reflect upon appropriate solutions through
a process of deliberation and debate.'' The reality, however, is that
representatives are very busy and must therefore rely on other
individuals and groups for much of their information.'82 Fortunately,
there is reason to believe that legislators have ready access to a variety
of relatively reliable sources, including knowledgeable and trusted staff,
179. See Sunstein, supra note 158, at 44 ("The system of checks and balances
within the federal structure was intended to operate as a check against self-interested
representation and factional tyranny in the event that national officials failed to fulfill
their responsibilities.").
180. Indeed, if most representatives were self-interested, the legislature could
operate contrary to the public good. This is, of course, one of the central lessons of
public choice theory. See DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC
CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 12-37 (1991) (discussing public choice theory's
focus on the role of interest groups in the political process and explaining that "[in
place of their prior assumption that legislators voted to promote their view of the public
interest, economists now postulate that legislators are motivated solely by self-
interest").
181. See Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J.
1539, 1558-61 (1988) (claiming that the framers of the U.S. Constitution "stressed that
their system was likely to attract and produce representatives who would have the virtue
associated with republican citizens").
182. See Bell, supra note 176, at 55-56 (reporting that a majority of legislators
rely upon voting "cues" and recommendations from others to make their decisions); see
also Bank One Chicago, N.A. v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co., 516 U.S. 264, 276
(1996) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("Legislators, like other busy people, often depend on
the judgment of trusted colleagues when discharging their official responsibilities.").
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colleagues, party leaders, and interest groups.'83 Even if an elected
representative mistakenly believed that she and her sources shared
common interests, the ongoing nature of the legislative process, limited
opportunities to influence decision makers, and the need for coalition-
building create incentives for those sources to provide accurate
information."8 4 This incentive is bolstered by the capacity of legislators
to verify what they are told by their sources during the lawmaking
process. 185
Moreover, once a legislator identifies a potential concern or has it
brought to her attention, action can ordinarily be taken to clarify or
resolve the problem.'86 Thus, for example, if one elected representative
183. See generally Alan L. Feld, Congress and the Legislative Web of Trust,
81 B.U. L. REV. 349 (2001).
184. See id. at 353 (explaining that "trust" arises in the legislative process from
the "personal interactions and rational incentives" of participants, who are typically
engaged in an ongoing process rather than a single transaction).
185. Indeed, political scientists have recently suggested that elected
representatives can be "enlightened" by other participants in the legislative process who
have knowledge of the relevant issues and external incentives to tell the truth. See
ARTHUR LUPIA & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, THE DEMOCRATIC DILEMMA: CAN CITIZENS
LEARN WHAT THEY NEED TO KNOW? 39-71 (1998) (describing the conditions for
persuasion and enlightenment in the political process).
186. I do not mean to suggest that legislators are always capable of identifying
problems with proposed legislation or resolving their concerns within the legislative
process. My claim is merely that representatives have a greater ability to understand
legislation and influence its content than voters in the ballot initiative process. This
claim is, of course, strongest when one compares the ballot initiative process to the
traditional or textbook legislative process where each member of the legislature can
typically seek to influence the contents of the laws that are enacted. See WILLIAM N.
ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY
24-38 (3d ed. 2001) (describing how a bill becomes a federal law). In recent years,
Congress has frequently deviated from the textbook process when it has enacted major
legislation. See generally BARBARA SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING: NEW
LEGISLATIVE PROCESSES IN THE U.S. CONGRESS (2d ed. 2000). The procedures that are
used for the enactment of such "unorthodox legislation" have a tendency to limit the
ability of individual members of Congress to understand and influence the contents of
legislation in ways that are reminiscent of the ballot initiative process. See id. at 9-81
(describing unorthodox lawmaking and documenting its frequency). The similarities
seem particularly striking in the budget process and when Congress enacts "omnibus
legislation." See id. at 70-81 (describing omnibus legislation, the budget process, and
legislative-executive summits); see also GLEN S. KRUTZ, HITCHING A RIDE: OMNIBUS
LEGISLATING IN THE U.S. CONGRESS 1-7 (2001) (explaining that omnibus packages
"typically contain a nucleus that has widespread support in Congress" and that
controversial attachments can be "tucked away" in such measures because members
"are seldom aware of the minutiae of omnibus packages").
While a detailed evaluation of "unorthodox" legislative procedures is beyond the
scope of this Article, their periodic use does not undermine my central arguments for
several reasons. First, the existence of shortcomings in other lawmaking processes
does not mean that we should decline to fix significant problems with the ballot
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was concerned about the potential impact of a proposed statute that
prohibited same-sex marriage "or similar unions for any purpose" on
the legality of domestic partnership benefits, she could request
interpretive guidance from the sponsors of the legislation or other
seemingly knowledgeable sources. She could proceed to take further
action to assess the reliability of this information and, if necessary, seek
an amendment to clarify the proposal's treatment of the issue. 187 The
fate of a proposed amendment would not only provide some measure of
the preferences of the legislative chamber on this particular issue,'88 but
it would also provide interested parties with meaningful guidance about
the likely consequences of the enactment. This information could
ultimately be utilized by representatives to formulate their positions on
the legislative proposal and determine how much effort to devote to any
potential opposition. 189
initiative process for which there are readily available solutions. Indeed, the story of
Proposal 2 could be understood as a cautionary tale about any lawmaking process that
lacks reasoned deliberation, is effectively controlled by a small group of people, and
precludes ordinary voters from understanding and influencing the specific contents of
the resulting product. To the extent that unorthodox legislation has these
characteristics, reform proposals like those set forth in this Article (and particularly the
interpretive techniques endorsed in Part III.B) may be entirely appropriate. Moreover,
the use of unorthodox procedures appears more common in the U.S. Congress than in
state legislatures, which are the most directly relevant unit of comparison for present
purposes. Unlike Congress, most states have single-subject rules and line-item vetoes
that limit the ability of the legislature to adopt unduly extensive packages of legislation
on a take-it or leave-it basis. Finally, it is widely understood that for better or for
worse, majoritarian preferences are significantly filtered by the ordinary legislative
process. To the extent that a similar dynamic occurs in the ballot initiative process
(perhaps overwhelmingly for the worse), it is worthwhile to recognize that direct
democracy does not accurately reflect the "will of the people."
187. When the legislature is operating under open rules, an individual
representative may propose an amendment directly on the floor of the chamber. If,
however, the chamber is operating under relatively restricted rules, the member may
need to enlist the support of a well-placed colleague, such as a member of the relevant
committee or the party leadership. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 186, at 32
(distinguishing between the House Rules Committee's decision to grant "an open rule
permitting amendments, a closed rule prohibiting all floor amendments, or a modified
closed rule permitting specified floor amendments and structuring the order of their
introduction").
188. Some legislators may, however, vote contrary to their true preferences for
strategic reasons or because they believe that an amendment is unnecessary. See
FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 180, at 40-41 (pointing out that "strategic behavior" by
legislators and other factors complicate the task of identifying legislative preferences
and suggesting that the outcomes of "clarifying amendments" may be particularly
unpredictable).
189. See Clark, supra note 102, at 450-63 (criticizing direct democracy on the
grounds that "single-issue votes cannot take into account that, for each person, some
issues will be more important than will others" and explaining that "legislative
processes allow minorities to engage in coalition building through logrolling and thus
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Although much has been said about how bicameralism and
presentment affect legislative bargaining and the expression of voter
preferences, 9' the point here is simply that those safeguards, along with
opportunities to amend proposed legislation, increase the likelihood that
representatives will be able to understand and potentially influence the
specific content of legislative proposals. Given the significance of the
issue, one might therefore predict that Proposal 2's potential effect on
domestic partnership benefits would have been foreseen and resolved if
this proposition had emerged from the ordinary legislative process-
and, in fact, this is reportedly what occurred when the joint proposal to
amend the Michigan Constitution was unsuccessfully initiated in the
legislature. 9 ' Nonetheless, even when the legislature does not foresee
or expressly resolve every important issue, 92 elected representatives
can still be held accountable for their decisions precisely because the
same individuals who enact a law have the ability (and, indeed, the
responsibility) to understand and attempt to influence its content.
The special problems that are posed by direct democracy stem
largely from the fact that the voters who enact initiated laws do not
have the same ability to understand or influence their content. The
story of Proposal 2 suggests that in certain situations, voters will be
inclined to cast their ballots based on strongly held opinions about the
central issue that is presented in an initiative election. Indeed, there is
no apparent reason to doubt that a majority of voters in Michigan were
opposed to the legal recognition of same-sex marriage on November 2,
secure outcomes on particular high-priority issues"); Collins & Oesterle, supra note
102, at 59-60 (recognizing that "minorities can persuade legislatures to amend the parts
of majoritarian bills they find most objectionable, even if a referendum would give
majority backing to those parts," because legislatures are able to reflect intensity of
preferences).
190. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Article I,
Section 7 Game, 80 GEO. L.J. 523 (1992).
191. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text; see also Frickey, supra
note 73, at 523-26 (predicting that the specific consequences of several broadly drafted
ballot measures would have been clarified and refined in the ordinary legislative
process). The safeguards that are provided by the legislative process are obviously not
foolproof. See supra notes 186-87. Indeed, similarly broad "defense of marriage"
amendments have been adopted by the legislatures of several states. See, e.g., Forum
for Equal. PAC v. McKeithen, 893 So. 2d 715 (La. 2005) (rejecting a single-subject
challenge to the broad defense of marriage amendment that was adopted by a joint
resolution of the legislature before being approved by voters in Louisiana).
192. A legislature may decline to resolve a specific interpretive issue through
inadvertence, a sincere belief that agencies or courts are better situated to implement
the law, or an "agreement to disagree" and abide by the subsequent decisions of those
other officials. Cf Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat'l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 865 (1984) (describing potential reasons for Congress's failure to resolve specific
policy issues).
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2004. At the same time, however, the story also suggests that some of
the initiative proponents hoped that their broadly drafted measure would
also be interpreted to prohibit public employers from providing
domestic partnership benefits. The immediate concern is not only that
this latter issue was never squarely presented to the voters, but also that
there was no opportunity for interested participants in the lawmaking
process to have ensured that this occurred.'93  Moreover, there is a
good chance that such an opportunity would have led to a different
outcome if, for example, a sufficient number of moderate voters held
(or were perceived by the initiative proponents to have held) the
following table of preferences: (1) prohibition on same-sex marriage
with no effect on domestic partnership benefits; (2) status quo (which,
incidentally, already included a statutory prohibition on same-sex
marriage); and (3) prohibition on same-sex marriage and domestic
partnership benefits. 94 Based on this analysis, there is a significant risk
that the prevailing interpretation of Proposal 2 has allowed a few
initiative proponents to achieve their own instrumental objectives in a
manner that conflicts with the preferences of Michigan voters.
An obvious objection to this claim is that there is no "proof" that
the views of the median voter corresponded with the foregoing table of
preferences. One might infer from the statements of the initiative
proponents, however, that they shared the very same intuition because
otherwise they could have been more forthcoming about the intended
consequences of their proposal. In any event, the burden of
establishing the electorate's alleged desire to prohibit domestic
partnership benefits should be placed on the initiative proponents who
were in a position to place this issue squarely on the voting agenda.
Because the existing initiative process provides no means of pitting two
alternative changes to the existing status quo against one another, we
have no other way of ascertaining the electorate's preferences among
the competing interpretive choices absent another ballot initiative.
These considerations provide additional support for the proposed
193. This helps to explain the rise of "counter-initiatives" in recent years,
which do provide some opportunity to modify the content of the measures that are
presented to voters. See David B. Magleby, Let the Voters Decide? An Assessment of
the Initiative and Referendum Process, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 13, 24 (1995) ("Many
groups facing an initiative that they think they cannot defeat have begun to sponsor their
own counter-initiative, a measure that goes part way in addressing the concerns of the
original initiative but is more acceptable to the opponents of the original initiative.").
Given the difficulty and expense associated with proposing a ballot initiative, this is too
high of a burden to impose upon those seeking to modify the electorate's choices.
194. Even if voters preferred option three to the existing status quo, the
inability to amend a proposed ballot measure may have precluded the electorate from
satisfying its true preferences as long as a majority preferred a prohibition on same-sex
marriage with no effect on domestic partnership benefits to either of those choices.
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canons of interpretation that would narrowly construe ambiguous ballot
measures in appropriate circumstances.' 95
A more subtle objection to this claim would be that sufficient
information was available during the ballot campaign for voters to
accurately express their preferences, and if they were concerned about
Proposal 2's potential effect on domestic parmership benefits, they
would have voted against the measure. Political scientists have
recognized for some time that voters have a conservative tendency to
vote against ballot measures when they are uncertain of the potential
consequences.' 96 Moreover, recent empirical literature has questioned
the notion that the absence of detailed knowledge about the substance of
ballot measures prevents the electorate from voting consistent with its
preferences.'97 In essence, this literature suggests that voters can rely
on information shortcuts, such as the known positions of public figures
or interest groups on an initiative measure, to cast sensible ballots that
may even replicate more fully informed decisions. 9 ' In combination
with a default rule that resolves doubt in favor of the status quo, this
literature suggests that longstanding concerns about voter competence in
direct democracy may be unjustified.
The implications of this literature for the story of Proposal 2 are
not entirely clear. The central purpose of the amendment may have
been apparent to voters who entered the booth with little or no previous
information about the measure based on the statement that appeared on
the ballot. As long as those voters could correctly ascertain the effect
of a yes or no vote,199 they may not have needed any further
195. See supra Part III.B.
196. See, e.g., Todd Donovan et al., Contending Players and Strategies:
Opposition Advantages in Initiative Campaigns, in CITIZENS AS LEGISLATORS, supra
note 85, at 80, 99 (claiming that initiative proponents "must overcome voter tendencies
to 'just vote no' when in doubt").
197. See Arthur Lupia & John G. Matsusaka, Direct Democracy.- New
Approaches to Old Questions, 7 ANN. REV. POL. Sci. 463 (2004).
198. See generally LuPIA & MCCUBBINS, supra note 185; BOWLER &
DONOVAN, supra note 94; Arthur Lupia, Shortcuts Versus Encyclopedias." Information
and Voting Behavior in California Insurance Reform Elections, 88 AM. POL. ScI. REV.
63 (1994). For an article that canvasses this literature and argues for reforms that
would make voting cues more readily available to the electorate, see Kang, supra note
94, at 1141.
199. This basic requirement of voter competence is not always a foregone
conclusion. See THOMAS E. CRONIN, DIRECT DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICS OF
INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM, AND RECALL 61-62, 89 (1989) (recognizing that "many
analysts who study populist democracy practices develop considerable reservations
about them after finding that citizens and voters often do not fully understand the
process, frequently vote with limited information, and sometimes vote contrary to their
own policy preferences," but concluding that the charge of voter incompetence is
"usually exaggerated"); MAGLEBY, supra note 74, at 142 (reporting that "studies of
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information to cast a ballot that accurately expressed their preferences
on the legal recognition of same-sex marriage. The difficulty is that
those voters could not have expressed any meaningful preference about
the continued validity of domestic partnership benefits.
For other voters, learning either that Proposal 2 was proposed by
an organization of conservative activists (Citizens for the Protection of
Marriage), vigorously supported by the Roman Catholic Church, or
opposed by the state's chapter of the ACLU,"° would likely have
enabled them to cast a ballot that accurately expressed their preferences
on the measure regardless of its treatment of domestic partnership
benefits. Still other voters would presumably remain, however, who
would not automatically defer to one of the preceding organizations and
for whom Proposal 2's treatment of domestic partnership benefits
would matter. If those individuals were aware from the campaign
debate that the amendment was ambiguous on this point, they would
presumably have voted against the measure. Accordingly, we might
conclude that the electorate truly preferred Proposal 2 to the existing
status quo as long as relatively ignorant voters who supported the
measure would not have changed their votes upon learning more about
the amendment's ambiguous treatment of domestic partnership benefits
in sufficient numbers to change the result of the election. If this were a
fair bet, we could then conclude that a majority of voters preferred
Proposal 2 to the existing status quo regardless of how its ambiguity
regarding domestic partnership benefits is resolved.
The foregoing analysis may portray the enactment of Proposal 2 in
its most favorable light, but several features of this explanation are
unsatisfying. First, of course, we do not know how many relatively
uninformed voters would have cast a different ballot if they were aware
of the debate over Proposal 2's potential effect on domestic partnership
benefits. Second, the assumption that voters who were aware of this
debate and cared about domestic partnership benefits would have voted
against Proposal 2 may be unwarranted. On the contrary, a significant
number of those voters may have believed the claims by initiative
proponents that Proposal 2 would not affect domestic partnership
benefits. Accordingly, they may have dismissed the concerns of the
ACLU as a "scare tactic" or "diversion from the real issue" precisely
as some of the initiative proponents suggested. °1 In other words, some
voters may have been deceived into voting contrary to their true
voting on statewide propositions have generally found that 10 percent or more of the
voters cast incorrect or confused ballots").
200. See supra notes 21-28 and accompanying text (identifying the most visible
supporters and opponents of Proposal 2).
201. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
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preferences based on the statements of the initiative proponents during
the ballot campaign. Even the most optimistic political science
literature on voter decision making recognizes that this is a possibility,
particularly when voters believe that they have the same interests as a
speaker and there are insufficient incentives for the "expert" to tell the
truth. 20
2
One of the central lessons of the story of Proposal 2 is that the
electorate may be especially vulnerable to deception about the specific
consequences of proposed ballot measures in some circumstances. In
this case, for example, it is easy to imagine that a majority of voters
would perceive their own interests as aligned with those of "Citizens
for the Protection of Marriage." It probably also bears noting that a
significant percentage of the relatively moderate voters who would be
deciding this election do not necessarily hold the ACLU in particularly
high esteem.20 3 Unlike the ordinary legislative process, the existing
ballot initiative process lacks sufficient incentives for initiative
proponents and other advocates to provide accurate information during
election campaigns.24 Nonetheless, some voters could mistakenly
believe that initiative proponents are obliged to tell the truth about the
intended consequences of their measure. Although the accuracy of
some statements about the content of a ballot measure could be
challenged during the course of an election campaign, voters are
unlikely to be capable of verifying the accuracy of many interpretive
claims. Thus, for example, no one could definitely say whether
Proposal 2 prohibited domestic partnership benefits because of the
patent ambiguity of the proposed amendment's text. The key point is
not that voters are uninformed or incapable of learning, but rather that
the environment created by the ballot initiative process is not conducive
to enlightenment.
In any event, the usual tendency of voters to prefer the status quo
when they are in doubt about the potential consequences of a measure
may have been overcome in this case by the simplicity of the central
question and the passionate views of many voters on the issue of same-
sex marriage. In other words, it could be that the strong feelings of
many voters who opposed same-sex marriage overwhelmed potential
202. See LUPIA & MCCUBBINS, supra note 185, at 70-74 (identifying
"conditions for deception" when voters rely upon information shortcuts to make their
decisions).
203. See David Cole, Are You Now or Have You Ever Been a Member of the
ACLU?, 90 MICH. L. REv. 1404, 1404-05 (1992) (book review) (describing the senior
Bush campaign's characterization of Michael Dukakis as "a 'card-carrying member of
the ACLU'" and explaining that "[ailmost by definition, the ACLU's clients stand
outside of, and threaten, the mainstream").
204. See supra Part II.
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concerns about Proposal 2's ambiguous treatment of domestic
partnership benefits. While we could conclude that such voters
expressed a strong desire to preclude the legal recognition of same-sex
marriage, we have absolutely no way of knowing whether they actually
preferred to eliminate the ability of public employers to provide
domestic partnership benefits. Any claim that the voters have already
expressed their preferences on this issue is simply disingenuous.
Although the extent of the bait-and-switch in direct democracy
merits closer empirical study,2"5 the complexities associated with
ascertaining the preferences of the voters who enacted Proposal 2 do
not eliminate the ability to make some preliminary observations. On
the one hand, it is possible that a majority of voters preferred a
constitutional amendment that precluded the legal recognition of same-
sex marriage and had ambiguous consequences for domestic partnership
benefits to the existing status quo. On the other hand, one cannot be
certain of this conclusion because numerous voters who favored the
existing treatment of domestic partnership benefits may have been
unaware of this issue or deceived into believing that Proposal 2
reflected their preference. There is certainly no basis for concluding
that a majority of voters who enacted Proposal 2 favored the
elimination of domestic partnership benefits. Indeed, the amendment
may only have prevailed because the electorate's strong opposition to
same-sex marriage overwhelmed potential concerns about such
"details." Finally, the ballot initiative process and the existing political
science literature that favorably portrays it are both fundamentally
flawed for failing to appreciate the possibility that most voters would
have preferred an alternative that was never presented.2 6
The proposals that are endorsed in the previous Part would
increase the probability that the results of an initiative election will
accurately represent the preferences of a majority of voters. First, they
would provide incentives for the initiative proponents to clearly
articulate the particular consequences at stake in the text of ballot
measures. The application of an agency model to direct democracy
would also create a formal lawmaking record where the important
aspects of a problem must be considered and resolved at an early stage
in the initiative process. The information generated by these reforms
205. To the extent that this technique was successfully employed here, it is
likely that initiative proponents will employ similar tactics in the future.
206. See BOWLER & DONOVAN, supra note 94, at 26-28 (depicting the decision
faced by voters in direct democracy as a question of whether the ballot initiative or the
existing status quo is closer to their ideal preferences); LUPIA & McCUBBINS, supra note
185, at 106-08 & tbl.7.2 (describing an experimental design where "the principal
chooses between two alternatives, called x and j" (emphasis omitted)).
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would not only allow very conscientious voters to identify their
interests, but it would also improve the reliability of the information
shortcuts that are available to the electorate by increasing the ability of
interested parties to verify the claims that are made during election
campaigns. Moreover, initiative proponents would be subject to
"penalties" for seeking to mislead voters if courts adopted an
interpretive canon that narrowly construed ambiguity consistent with
their campaign statements or were authorized to review the validity of
successful ballot measures under an arbitrary or capricious standard.
Because these reforms would improve the quality of the decision-
making environment for the electorate, they should be fully embraced
by advocates of direct democracy who believe that public policy should
reflect the prepolitical preferences of a majority of voters.
There are, of course, many critics of direct democracy who do not
believe that public policy should necessarily reflect the unmediated
preferences of a majority of voters.2 °7 Indeed, the federal constitutional
structure was designed to ensure that lawmaking was the product of
thoughtful deliberation by elected representatives, rather than the
passions or narrow self-interests of the people.20 8 The safeguards of
representation and bicameralism and presentment therefore encourage
lawmakers to achieve a broad consensus on ways of promoting the
public good that take the views of political minorities into account.2°
Because these attributes of republican government are absent from
direct lawmaking, contemporary advocates of deliberative democracy
tend to believe that the existing initiative process is inherently
problematic. These concerns are significantly magnified by the
inability of voters to understand and influence the specific content of
proposed ballot measures, as well as by the absence of effective
mechanisms for holding the initiative proponents who have this capacity
accountable for their actions. The bait-and-switch in direct democracy
is particularly troubling from this perspective because it allows the
initiative proponents to capitalize on the passions of the electorate to
achieve their own instrumental objectives without providing any
207. See supra note 103. For more recent contributions of this nature, see
Sherman J. Clark, The Character of Direct Democracy, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES
341, 341 (2004) (suggesting that direct democracy fosters a "narrow and irresponsible
vision of citizenship and political participation" because it merely requires citizens to
announce their preferences and desires); Marci A. Hamilton, Direct Democracy and the
Protestant Ethic, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 411, 414 (2004) (exploring the
protestant notion of a "calling" to explain the Constitution's rejection of direct
democracy).
208. See Staszewski, supra note 3, at 402; THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 16-23
(James Madison) (Roy P. Fairfield ed., 1981).
209. See Staszewski, supra note 137.
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meaningful opportunity for reasoned deliberation or debate about
whether a particular course of action would serve the public good.
The substantive canons of interpretation endorsed in the preceding
Part would respond to the normative deficiencies of the initiative
process by alleviating the problem of faction, providing an incentive for
initiative proponents to be honest about the intended consequences of
their measure, and preventing the displacement of preexisting law that
was enacted through the legislative process on subsidiary issues that
were not clearly at stake in the ballot election. 210 As explained above,
they would also provide an incentive for the initiative proponents to
clearly articulate the intended consequences in the text of their measure.
The ability of some members of the electorate to ascertain the specific
content of a proposal would likely improve the quality of the
deliberations during the ballot campaign. Thus, for example, a more
vigorous debate about the substantive merits of prohibiting public
employers from providing domestic partnership benefits would almost
certainly have occurred if this issue had been squarely presented by the
text of Proposal 2.
It is admittedly unrealistic to believe that most voters will have the
time or interest to function as deliberative democrats in the ballot
initiative process. 21' The use of heuristic cues to make voting decisions
in this context may ironically operate as a form of second-rate
representation because voters are really delegating their decision-
making authority to some agent with greater expertise.212 If we do not
want to resolve complex issues of public policy pursuant to a process
that resembles junior high school student council elections,213 we should
ensure that the unelected and otherwise unaccountable initiative
proponents who have the exclusive authority to control the specific
content of successful ballot measures engage in a process of reasoned
deliberation.
210. See text accompanying supra notes 139-41.
211. See Kang, supra note 94, at 1143 ("Voters, quite simply, choose
rationally to be ignorant about politics.").
212. See Staszewski, supra note 3, at 412-35 (claiming that the privileged status
of initiative proponents in direct democracy resembles a delegation of lawmaking
authority); cf Clark, supra note 102, at 471 (pointing out that proposed reforms of
direct democracy tend to resemble representative government and claiming that, in
general, it may be better to use the real thing).
213. See James Kuklinski & Norman L. Hurley, On Hearing and Interpreting
Political Messages. A Cautionary Tale of Citizen Cue-Taking, 56 J. POL. 729, 732
(1994) ("[A]lthough the rationality and economy of cue-taking are now well
established, it is very possible that citizens-as-cue-takers focus so heavily on the 'who'
that the 'what' recedes to the background.").
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This objective could be achieved by subjecting initiative
proponents to the same procedural obligations that presently constrain
administrative lawmaking. Because notice-and-comment rulemaking
and hard-look judicial review effectively replace the structural
safeguards that are provided by the Constitution to promote republican
principles of government, the application of an agency model to direct
democracy would substantially improve the democratic legitimacy of
the ballot initiative process from the same normative perspective.
Moreover, the deliberation that took place in the official lawmaking
record would clarify the intended scope of a proposed ballot measure
and perhaps increase its likelihood of promoting the public good. It is
conceivable, for example, that Proposal 2's proponents would have
taken the potential elimination of domestic partnership benefits off the
table if they were obligated to consider the policy's adverse
consequences for the health care of families or the ability of state
universities to recruit the highest caliber employees. In any event, the
initiative proponents in a deliberative democracy should at least be
required to consider competing perspectives and respond to the
important aspects of a problem in a reasoned fashion. Otherwise, it
would be difficult to say that the subsequent results of the ballot
initiative process were a meaningful reflection of the will of the people.
CONCLUSION
One proponent of direct democracy in Oregon exemplified the
popular distrust of elected officials when she declared that the initiative
process "is the only thing we have to protect ourselves from the abuses
of big government. I hate to see people taken advantage of by shyster
lawyers, crooks, and smooth-talking, conniving politicians. "'214 Yet,
the proponents of Proposal 2 assured the people of Michigan prior to
the initiative election that "the proposal will not affect benefits offered
to people living together or in same-sex relationships." 15  When the
final votes were counted, however, some of the same proponents
proclaimed that "[b]enefits only to homosexuals are a formal
recognition of a homosexual relationship as equal or similar to
marriage.... And the voters have said they don't want that."2 1 6 This
Article has suggested that the people should have something to protect
themselves from the abuses of the special interests that dominate the
ballot initiative process.
214. See BRODER, supra note 84, at 201 (quoting Loren Parks).
215. See Kaplan & Moss, supra note 7.
216. See Range, supra note 9.
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In particular, the Article has claimed that the judiciary should
adopt interpretive canons that would narrowly construe ambiguous
ballot measures in appropriate circumstances. Moreover, jurisdictions
that authorize direct democracy should adopt structural reforms that
would facilitate reasoned deliberation in the ballot initiative process and
hold initiative proponents accountable for their actions. For reasons
explained above, these proposals could eliminate the bait-and-switch in
direct democracy and minimize the collateral consequences of
successful ballot measures. Because they would also simultaneously
increase the ability of voters to accurately express their preferences and
improve the quality of deliberations during the lawmaking process,
such reforms should be fully embraced by advocates of fundamentally
different normative perspectives.
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